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Acronyms 
(ANC) African National Congress
(ART) Antiretroviral Treatment
(ARV) Antiretrovirals 
(ASEAN) Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(AZT) Zidovudine or azidothymidine
(BDP) Botswana Democratic Party
(BNTP) Botswana National Tuberculosis Program
(BONASO) Botswana Network of AIDS Services Organization
(DOTS) Direct Observed Treatment Short-course
(GDP) Gross Domestic Product
(HAART) Highly Active Antiretroviral Therarpy
(HIV) Human Immunodifficiency Virus
(IPT) Isoniazid Preventive Therapy
(MDR-TB) Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis
(NACA) National AIDS Coordination Agency (Botswana)
(NACOSA) Networking HIV/AIDS Community of South Africa
(NSP) National Strategic Plan (South Africa)
(NTCP) National Tuberculosis Control Program (South Africa)
(PEPFAR) President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
(PLHIV) People Living with HIV
(RSA) Republic of South Africa
(SADC) Southern African Development Community
(SANAC) South African National AIDS Council
(STI) Sexually Transmitted Illness
(TB) Tuberculosis
(UN) United Nations
(UNAIDS) The Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS
(VCT) Voluntary Counseling and Testing 
(WHO) World Health Organization
(XDR-TB) Extremely Drug Resistant Tuberculosis
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Chapter 1: Introduction
 Diseases have significantly influenced societies in negative and positive ways through 
various periods in history, challenging groups to respond appropriately in the best interest of 
their people. The rise of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/ acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) has presented numerous social, economic, and political challenges globally 
due to high rates of infection. Barnett and Whiteside argue that:
 HIV/AIDS has succeeded in joining people around the world in a common consciousness 
 about its threats and implications. It is the only disease to have a dedicated United 
 Nations organisation- UNAIDS-charged with the single aim of confronting it. It is the 
 first epidemic where the long-term implications could be recognised as they happen.1
The formidable international focus on the pandemic has enabled growth in social and medical 
research throughout the global community. However, due to the structure of the virus and the 
way in which HIV/AIDS attacks the immune system, it is also crucial to consider the effects of 
opportunistic infections in conjunction with the spread of HIV/AIDS.2 
 With a compromised immune system, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, colloquially known 
as tuberculosis, becomes a greater threat to the infected individual. According to the World 
Health Organization, “The risk of developing tuberculosis (TB) is estimated to be between 21-34 
times greater in people living with HIV than among those without HIV infection.”3 Furthermore, 
350,000 HIV positive patients died from tuberculosis in 2010.4 While tuberculosis has 
4
1 Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization (New York: 
Palgrave and Macmillan, 2006), 4.
2 An “opportunistic infection disease caused by a microbe that does not usually cause disease. It occurs in unusual 
circumstances, such as when the host’s immune system is weakened.” as cited in Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside, 
AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2006), G:10.
3 Guidelines for intensified tuberculosis case finding and isoniazid preventive therapy for people living with HIV in 
resource-constrained setting. World Health Organization, 2011.as cited in World Health Organization, “World Health 
Organization HIV/TB Facts 2011,” HIV and Tuberculosis, http://www.who.int/en/
4 Ibid.
significantly influenced societies for centuries, the only current method of treatment and 
prevention is the use of antibiotics and in some instances a combination of antibiotics. 
Contracting HIV/AIDS heightens the risk of having a deadly opportunistic infection, such as 
active tuberculosis, increasing the need for a focused response to combat the risk of co-infection 
alongside HIV prevention and treatment strategies. In particular, it is necessary for health 
policies on the state level to respond with a strong focus on halting these co-infectious diseases. 
The Policy Question:
 The HIV/TB co-infection burden on patients requires a larger response from the national 
policy arena. Tuberculosis is the foremost opportunistic infection responsible for death in HIV/
AIDS patients5; thus, the “WHO recommends the implementation of collaborative HIV/TB 
activities to decrease the burden of HIV/TB.”6 While the World Health Organization suggests 
that, based on biological evidence, these two diseases be combatted together, only some states 
most affected by HIV/AIDS have national policies similar to WHO recommendations. In turn, 
this raises questions about how health recommendations are translated into state policies.
 Health policy nonetheless is a challenging political process to understand. Gill Walt 
argues that “[t]he extent to which health commands any attention on the government’s policy 
agenda therefore depends to some extent on the skills of the minister to argue for competing 
claims on government’s budget, and to put across the needs for, and implications of, a new 
5
5 World Health Organization, “World Health Organization HIV/TB Facts 2011,” HIV and Tuberculosis, http://
www.who.int/en/.
6 Ibid.
direction of health policy.”7 This particular political reality describes how it is the bureaucracy’s 
job to argue for alterations in state disease policy. While contemporary literature argues that 
health should be viewed as a security issue, policy arenas do not address health as issues such as 
border security. Illnesses are often perceived as scientific and social problems requiring internal 
and external research to be fully addressed. To fully address health concerns with policy, state 
politicians have to demonstrate that the health problem requires a political response. This 
argument assumes that the health bureaucracy’s desire to create policy on specific health issues 
drives the state’s incorporation of disease treatment plans. Walt, however, does not address the 
idea that the fight on HIV/AIDS is a global project with influences beyond sovereign states.8 
Individual states, especially many high burden states, are unable to learn effective means to treat 
a given disease, whether social or scientific, thus requiring international influences to aid in the 
learning process.
The Biological Mechanisms
 Scientific and social evidence drives alterations in health policy fashioned by the World 
Health Organization, seen as an agent of learning for many states. Moreover, the scientific 
evidence is available to policy makers in epidemic states, including Botswana and South Africa. 
Since the 1980s, the global scientific community has been able to unearth the understanding 
about how HIV evolves, influencing national treatment. The explanation of the scientific 
mechanisms of HIV and TB offer a strong insight into why these diseases require dual treatment.
6
7 Gill Walt, Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power: People, governments, and international agencies- 
who drives policy and how it is made (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), 86.
8 Sovereignty is “the idea that a state has a government that exercises authority over its territory” as cited in Joseph 
S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History  (New York: Pearson 
Longman, 2009), 292.
 Beginning with HIV, the virus enters an individual, or “host,” through the exchange of 
bodily fluids including blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and breast milk.9 Once the virus has 
entered the host, the virus begins the incubation period which is when “the number of pathogens 
is growing, and there is no disease until a given population threshold is reached.”10  As the 
pathogens spread, HIV searches for specific proteins called CD411 proteins, found on the edges 
of helper-T cells, which respond to invading pathogens and the creation of antibodies.12 Once 
HIV finds the CD4 proteins the virus surrounds the proteins. After this occurs:
 [A] series of events begins that allows the virus to enter the host cell’s cytoplasm. The 
 virus then releases its genetic material, and viral replication begins. Newly produced 
 progeny virus leaves the infected cell and the cell is killed. Normally T cells survive for 
 years, but after HIV infection, most infected cells die within a day or two.13
From this point the virus continues to multiply and inhibit the helper-T cells’ ability to respond to 
any infection. With the immune system constantly fighting to stay alive, and with the help of 
antiretrovirals, pathogens are able to enter and harm the body. With a compromised immune 
system it is difficult for the body to have an innate, or initial response to an invading pathogen. 
 With little to no response from to an invading pathogen tuberculosis is able to be more 
successful in spreading in a host. Tuberculosis enters an individual through air droplets passed 
through the process of breathing.14 Upon entrance, the droplets containing the bacteria travel to 
7
9 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV Transmission, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/
transmission.htm
10 Bruce V. Hofkin, Living in a Microbial World (New York: Talyor & Francis Group, 2011), 271.
11 CD4 proteins are measured to determine how serious the infection is and how many helper-T cells have been 
destroyed by the virus as cited in WebMD, HIV, AIDs, and the CD4 Count, http://www.webmd.com/hiv-aids/cd4-
count-what-does-it-mean.
12 Hofkin, G:6.
13 Hofkin, 309.
14 Neil W. Schluger and William N. Rom, “The Host Imunne Response to Tuberculosis,” American Journal or 
Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 157, no. 3 (1998): 679. http://ajrccm.atsjournals.org/content/157/3/679.long.
the lungs where the acid coated cells remain. These particular “cells are thus very hardy and 
difficult to destroy. They are resistant to many toxic chemicals as well as the phagocytic activity 
of immune system cells.”15 Once the bacteria enter the lungs, there are a variety of paths that the 
immune system can create, depending on its ability to respond to the invasion:
 The initial host response can be completely effective and kill all bacilli, such that the 
 patient has no chance of developing tuberculosis at any time in the future; the organisms 
 can begin to multiply and grow immediately after infection, causing clinical disease 
 known as primary tuberculosis; bacilli may become dormant and never cause dis- ease at 
 all, such that the patient has what is referred to as latent infection, manifest only by a 
 positive tuberculin skin test; or the latent organisms can eventually begin to grow, with 
 resultant clinical disease, known as reactivation tuberculosis.16
Active tuberculosis causes respiratory distress and if untreated, with a variety of antibiotics 
depending on the strain’s resistance to particular medicines, leads to the deterioration of the lung 
health. 
 Now consider how an HIV positive patient’s immune system would respond to 
tuberculosis, whether coming from a dormant form of tuberculosis or through recent contraction. 
If an HIV positive patient has lower CD4 counts, this means that his/her body is less able to fight 
off an invasion due to the fact that the method of reporting an invasion is damaged. Without the 
support of antiretroviral treatment and antibiotic treatment, the patient will be unable to combat 
the disease. In the case of the HIV positive patient, there is a much higher risk of death from 
tuberculosis if untreated in conjunction with a regimen to combat HIV from spreading. These 
biological implications illustrate an ardent demand for public health policy to appropriately 
require these diseases be treated contemporaneously. 
8
15 Hofkin, 56.
16 Schluger and Rom, par 5.
Research Methodology
 Considering the scientific foundations and the World Health Organization policies, the 
following explains how Botswana and South Africa’s health policy will be investigated. The 
question of, “Why do Botswana and South Africa not have national policies focusing on treating 
HIV/TB co-infection when the World Health Organization recommends that integrated treatment 
programs are necessary?” will be investigated through a most-similar-systems, small-N case 
study design. In addition, a mixed method of qualitative and quantitative research will be used to 
help answer the question.
 The use of a small-N case study design paired with the most-similar-systems method of 
comparison that engages states with similar foundations will be used to investigate the policy 
differences between Botswana and South Africa. A most-similar-system comparison “reduces the 
number of ‘disturbing’ variables to be kept under control.”17 This means that the comparison 
limits the potential lurking variables to explain a situation. Yet, managing to find a strong 
comparison can be tedious if one wants to compare a large amount of cases. A small-N case 
study allows for a small number of cases to be closely investigated. For this study, the use of a 
most-similar-systems design investigating Botswana and South Africa will be used due to the 
prevalence of the two diseases in each state, the varied response of the national legislatures, and 
their cultural and social similarities.
 The comparison method will be investigated using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Qualitative evidence will come from a variety of primary and secondary sources, 
including policy reports, articles written on the political structure and the policy making arena, 
9
17 Donatella Della Porta,, ed. and Michael Keating, ed., Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A 
Pluralist Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 214.
and health reports from the states. The use of these particular sources allows for a strong 
description of how policy decisions are made in Botswana and South Africa. Moreover, looking 
at the evidence through international regime theory, as opposed to security theory, will allow for 
a stronger assessment of policy translation. Statistics will be added to enhance the narrative 
explained through the printed sources. Infection rate statistics and funding data will be used as 
primary sources for quantitative evidence from databases such as the World Bank, The United 
States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and government expenditure reports. The use of correlation and 
regression methods will further attempt to understand the interconnection of budget rates and 
infection rates in making policy decisions. By using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
methods the answer to the policy discrepancy will emerge as both types of evidence complement 
each other to create a strong and complete picture. 
 The above methodology was created over a series of experiences from both my study 
abroad experience and classwork. While living in Botswana on the ACM Botswana: Immersion 
in Southern Africa program in the spring of 2011, I attempted to investigate the role of stigma of 
HIV in policy creation. However, due to strict government research regulations, my request was 
denied to explore this topic by the Ministry of Health. While continuing with a different project, 
the public health course and political science course at the University of Botswana helped me to 
discover the question of policy making and the interconnection of HIV and tuberculosis 
treatment. After spending five months studying and immersed in Botswana’s politics, the 
question of HIV/TB co-infection policy emerged. During the fall of 2011, I was able to create a 
research plan in Government 500: Research Methods in International and Comparative Politics 
10
to research and answer this question. The evolution of this question and creation of a research 
guide in the seminar class helped to establish the above small-N, most-similar-systems design to 
pose and evaluate the question on HIV/TB co-infection treatment.
 
Botswana and South Africa as Cases:
 The cases of Botswana and South Africa offer valuable insight into the posed question 
due to the nature of these states and the impact that HIV/AIDS has played in their recent history. 
Authors of larger HIV/AIDS investigations, including Barnett and Whiteside, have used the 
same comparison when explaining HIV, thus making these states a valuable comparison.18 These 
two states often lend themselves to an easy comparison especially due to the fact that both 
Botswana and South Africa are located in the region that, “holds the global record for the most 
reported cases, highest incidence of the disease, and the highest death rate as a consequence of 
the disease.”19 Considering the similarities between the states and the difference in policy 
outcome the comparison will be presented as a most-similar-system comparison based on 
economic strength, cultural similarities, and HIV and tuberculosis influence, while having 
differing policy responses.
 As other authors have used the similarities between Botswana and South Africa it is also 
important to understand these two states in context of the African continent. As seen below, these 
two wealthy states in Africa have similar amounts of infectious disease and life expectancy as 
other states, and in turn face problems found throughout the continent. This highlights the fact 
11
18 Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization (New York: 
Palgrave and Macmillan, 2006), 130-137.
19 Myfundi, Global distribution of diseases: TB, HIV/Aids, cholera and malaria, http://myfundi.co.za/e/
Global_distribution_of_diseases:_TB,_HIV/Aids,_cholera_and_malaria.
that, while Botswana and South Africa have been able to create economic growth, that they are 
unable to prevent HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis from impacting their civilians. Understanding how 
Botswana and South Africa fit into the continent as a whole enables one to understand the 
presented question
   Botswana and South Africa in Context of the Continent
Categories Botswana South Africa Africa
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)
$30.09 billion $422 billion $1.09 billion 
(average)
Population 2,098,018 48,810,427 853,600,000
HIV Infection 24.8% of adults
(2011)
17.8% of adults 
(2009)
11.4% of adults 
(2004)
Tuberculosis Infection 503 (incidence/
100,000 people) 
(2010)
981 (incidence be 
100,000 people) 
(2010)
29% of Global 
Burden.
Life expectancy 
(average)
55.74 years 49.41 years 53.8 years 
Colonial Experience British Protectorate British Colony Varied 
Political System Parliamentary 
Republic
Republic Varied 
Response to 
International Norms
Very responsive Slow in responding Dependent on each 
state
(The following information provided by CIA Factbook, Statistic Brain,& the New England Journal of 
Medicine20) 
 Botswana and South Africa share a border southern Africa with robust diplomatic and 
economic ties. Botswana is considered to be an economic miracle due to the well negotiated 
program to mine diamonds found in Jwaneng area. Diamonds enabled Botswana to become a 
12
20 The New England Journal of Medicine. Tuberculosis in Africa- Combatting an HIV-Driven crisis.http://
www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0800809; UCLA. HIV/AIDS in Africa and US National Security.http://
www.international.ucla.edu/africa/grca/publications/article.asp?parentid=107610.;United States CIA Factbook. 
Botswana. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html;United State CIA Factbook. 
South Africa. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html.
wealthy state in the southern region with the ability to create general policies to help with the 
development of the state. South Africa, on the other hand, has not only benefited from natural 
deposits of gold and diamonds, but a durable manufacturing sector that exports to many states in 
the South Africa Development Community (SADC). Economic inefficiency does not inhibit the 
ability of these states to provide health care, unlike other states in the region.
 Beyond economic success, both states share cultural similarities due to their relative 
location. Ethnic similarities are found with the Tswana population, predominately in Botswana, 
but also across the border in northern South Africa. Further, both states reportedly have social 
constraints on combating HIV; for example the use of condoms was a massive project 
undertaken in both of these states. Also traditional beliefs around sexual relations and trust of 
partners has been cited by anthropologists, including Mark Hunter’s Love in the Time of AIDS. 
Historically, both states at one point were part of the British Empire, while in different capacities, 
creating similar developed societies and parliamentary political structures. These cultural 
similarities enable an easy comparison, especially with the social influence of epidemic diseases.
In addition, Botswana’s and South Africa’s epidemics have grown exponentially due to a variety 
of social and cultural constructs. Due to the cultural similarity between the two states, the 
epidemics exponentially grew from the influence of migrant labor, the adverse response to the 
use of condoms, mother to child transmission, and limited male circumcision.21 Both Botswana 
and South Africa have large amounts of intended migrant labor22 due to their endowments of 
gold and diamonds. Males with families would travel to the mines and leave their families in the 
13
21 Mark Hunter, Love in the Time of AIDS: Inequality, Gender, and Rights in South Africa (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2010), 25-35.
22 Migrant labor in Botswana and South Africa refers to individuals who leave their homes and go to the mines, in 
their state,for wage labor. After a period of time working, they return to their villages for their families.
rural homesteads.23 Males would spend extended periods of time at these mines engaging in 
prostitution and other sexual relationships and then return to their home villages to be with their 
families.24 For these men, “[t]he risk of HIV infection and transmission is high, and eventually, 
by extension, the risk to women is high.”25 Migrant labor thus increased the accessibility of the 
HIV virus to many individuals, spreading the disease quickly. In conjunction with male 
migration, the use of condoms and altering view of relationships during the early phases of AIDS 
helped spread the disease exponentially. Hunter’s investigation found that individuals with 
multiple partners would not use a condom with their primary partner, for example, the parent of 
one’s child.26 Gender roles further add to the use of condoms and whether or not women feel as 
though they can ask for their partner to use a condom. Discrepancies in condom use in social 
settings also aided the epidemics ability to spread in both of these populations. 
 Beyond condom use and migrant labor, mother to child transmission influenced the 
growth of the infection rate. Mother to child transmission is only curbed with the use of 
medication during child birth and not breastfeeding the newborn.27 To ensure that neither of these 
actions occur, medication and formula are required. These particular programs, however, started 
after the virus had already massively infected the population. Further, science has argued that 
male circumcision helps decrease the transmission of the virus. In South Africa, in particular, the 
practice of male circumcision was stopped under British rule and only reintegrated into programs 
14
23 Mark Hunter, 38.
24 Ibid, 44-47.
25 Rebecca L. Upton, “‘Women Have No Tribe’: Connecting Carework, Gender, and Migration in an Era of HIV/
AIDS in Botswana,” Gender and Society 17, no. 2 (2003): 319.
26 Mark Hunter, 136-137.
27 International HIV & AIDS Charity, HIV & AIDS in Botswana, http://www.avert.org/aids-botswana.htm.
as late as 2010.28 Considering these particular social settings, the HIV virus was able to rapidly 
spread through the population, making Botswana and South Africa some of the states with the 
high HIV/AIDS infection rates in the world.
 Not only do these states have some of the highest rates of HIV and TB in the world, both 
states are located in the region with the overall highest incidence of HIV and TB on the planet. 
Politically both of these states admit that HIV and TB play a major role in the daily living of 
their citizens and general health goals on a national level. Considering the influence of HIV 
infection, Barnett and Whiteside cite that these two states “have the second highest levels of 
adult prevalence (35.8% of adults are infected in Botswana), and the largest number of infected 
people in any country, 6.29 million in South Africa.”29 High HIV rates have led to a rise in 
opportunistic infections, including tuberculosis. According to the Global Report on Tuberculosis 
Control, South Africa is considered to be a high burden area for HIV and TB, while Botswana is 
not listed as a high burdened area.30 However, in terms of the WHO report, when determining 
who is considered high burden, they are going off limited information, due to that fact that states 
do not hold nationwide surveys into the prevalence of HIV and TB. Further, Botswana has a 
population of only roughly two million which, in comparison to the other listed states, is greatly 
smaller in the amount of tuberculosis cases. Considering that a large proportion of both societies 
are infected by HIV and TB, it is reasonable to believe that these states would implement policy 
to limit the social and economic impacts of the disease through treatment policies. Even with 
15
28 International HIV & AIDS Charity. HIV & AIDS in South Africa. http://www.avert.org/aidssouthafrica.htm
29 Barnett and Whiteside, 131.
30 World Health Organization (WHO), “Global Report on Tuberculosis Control,” WHO/CDS/2011, (Geneva: WHO, 
2011): 13.
such high prevalence, neither state has yet to fully adopt a cohesive policy requiring both 
diseases to be treated together.
 While Botswana and South Africa face the same public health crisis, they have used 
different political means to address the situation. As of January of 2012 Botswana released TB/
HIV policy guidelines describing how the integration of the disease programs are to be finalized. 
The guidelines “respond to a demand from all stakeholders involved in the care of dually 
infected patients for guidance on how best to develop and implement HIV/TB collaborative 
activities.”31 These particular activities have been active since 2005, when the Ministry of Health 
began coordinating the integration of the National HIV Program and National Tuberculosis 
Program. With a focus on addressing co-infection, Botswana stands far ahead of South Africa, 
which, instead of integration guidelines, has National Strategic Plans that hopes to increase the 
availability of co-infective treatment throughout the state. South Africa’s strategic plans outline 
how the government, alongside non-governmental organizations, should offer comprehensive 
services for patients with HIV, other sexually transmitted illnesses, and tuberculosis. Kgalema 
Motlanthe, the South African National AIDS Council Deputy President remarked that he is 
“confident that we are ready to build on the above achievements. Once again, our strength lies in 
our unity.”32 The South African government is using the five year national strategic plan strategy, 
outlining multiple goals, including changing health and poverty, to create coordinated efforts 
between the government and non-governmental organizations. Using a most-similar-system 
method, the variables of culture and economics are ruled out as explanations for the differences 
16
31 Ministry of Health Botswana, Botswana TB/HIV Policy Guidelines (Gaborone: Republic of Botswana, 2011), 4.
32 South African National AIDS Council, National Strategic Plan on HIV, STIs and TB: 2012-2016 (Pretoria: 
Ministry of Health, 2012), 9 . http://www.sanac.org.za/index.php/nsp-2012-2016/national-strategic-plan.
in the policies in these states. Considering the similarities and differences between these two 
states, Botswana and South Africa offer a valuable comparison to investigate the translation of 
international policy norms into state policy with the co-infected diseases of HIV and 
tuberculosis, as health policy and not a security issue.
 Studying Botswana and South Africa offers a chance to understand how the developing 
world integrates international norms to policy. The use of international relations techniques, 
comparative politics, and public policy methodology will be used to fully answer the posed 
question of HIV/TB co-infection policy. 
 The following chapter reviews the literature of public policy on incrementalism and 
punctuated equilibrium theory and international regime theory. Chapter Three will apply 
international regime theory to the World Health Organization and the policy recommendations 
created over the last few years. Chapters Four and Five will investigate how Botswana and South 
Africa’s policy have developed and changes through international policy translation. Chapter six 
will discuss the similarities and differences between the cases and offer a method to understand 
policy translation more generally.
17
Chapter Two: State and International Policy Theories
 Before delving into the exploration of Botswana and South Africa’s reaction to HIV and 
TB, it is necessary to understand how policies are assembled in states and on the international 
level; however, state and international policy formulation are not interconnected in policy theory 
literature. Since these theories are not interconnected, this chapter investigates international 
regime theory and the public policy models of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium 
theory. Understanding these theories and models separately will help to understand each of the 
cases through the employment of international and state models. Considering disjointed models, 
the following section explores the major models used in this investigation.
State Policy Theories: Incrementalism and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
 Incrementalism is a public policy model that argues that policies in a state do not change 
instantly, but slowly change through small policy adjustments for both states and international 
organizations. Lindblom, referenced in Gill Walt’s book, “describes the policy process as one of 
disjointed incrementalism or muddling through.”33 What is meant by “muddling through”? 
Lindblom expands describing the muddling through as “the process of negotiation, bargaining 
and adjustment between different interest groups (or partisans) to influence policy.”34 From this 
statement Lindblom argues that different politicians argue for different changes and as the groups 
slowly begin to agree, specific changes are implemented, and over time the policy as a whole is 
18
33 Gill Walt, Health Policy: An Introduction to Process and Power: People, governments, and international 
agencies- who drives policy and how it is made (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994), 49.
34 Ibid, 49.
altered. Slow alterations can be followed based on the stage of the policy making process in 
which a given group or state is currently engaged.
 While incrementalism offers valuable insights by creating stages, incrementalism is 
“views the policy process as a device (a heuristic, as it were) to help disaggregate an otherwise 
seamless web of public policy transactions, as was too regularly depicted in political science.”35 
Looking at how policy is perceived and how policy alterations are presented enables this model 
to be placed onto different systems of government in a variety of states, and not just the 
American political system. In turn, this is a model that allows political scientists to move away 
from the study of institutions and into the discovery of how policy is made through decision 
making and agreements.36 Understanding how this model is intended to be used allows one to 
implement the incrementalist model with a defined stages. Gill Walt references the basic stages 
that Kingdon presents which are:
1) setting of the agenda; 
 2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made; 
3) an authoritative choice among those specified alternatives; and 
 4) the implementation of the decision.37
Considering these stages, one can apply the model readily to any given policy alterations in a 
given state and determine where in the policy creation process a given policy is located. 
Understanding the stages will enable a stronger understanding of how the policy has moved over 
time.
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 While some authors argue that policy alterations work through small incremental 
changes, there is another argument that changes come from large jumps, referred to as 
punctuations. Baumgarnter and others observe that, “[p]olitical processes are often driven by a 
logic of stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they also produce large-scale departures 
from the past.”38 The easiest way to envision punctuations is through budget changes, where 
suddenly one year a particular program receives a substantially larger amount of funding than 
previous years. However, in context of the entire annual budget: 
 Because we expect budgets generally to change very little, but occasionally to change a 
 great deal, we hypothesize that annual budget changes will be distributed 
 leptokurtotically. That is, their univariate distribution should have a large slender central 
 peak (representing a stability logic), weak shoulders (representing the difficulty in 
 making moderate changes), and big tails (representing episodic punctuations).39
Essentially, the entire budget will appear to be a traditional bell curve with specific programs 
receiving more money. However, a more effective way to discover punctuations is through 
looking at data in one program over time. From this perspective an individual is able to see if 
there was a year in which funding increased, focusing on a point of investigation. Discovering 
dramatic changes provides a focal point to understanding policy reshaping in conjunction with 
the model of incrementalism. 
 If punctuations and incrementalism help define policy alterations, what explains going 
from a period where there is general agreement and then large jumps in funding, rate of a dole, or 
other forms of measurable jumps? Connie Gersick describes the policy period as having three 
distinct phases: an equilibrium phase, a barrier breaking phase, and a revolutionary phase. Each 
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phase explains the movements leading up to a punctuation. The equilibrium phase is when “the 
system's basic organization and activity patterns stay the same; the equilibrium period consists of 
maintaining and carrying out these choices.”40 Essentially this idea matches up with the concept 
that incrementalists follow. But, how does a group of people break away from the systematic, 
institutionalized pattern of small changes over extended periods of time? Gersick references 
Tushman and Romanelli who suggested that “even if a system overcomes its own cognitive and 
motivational barriers against realizing a need for change, the ‘networks of interdependent 
resource relationships and value commitments’ generated by its structure often prevent its being 
able to change.”41 In turn, policy makers have to alter their cognition, motivation, and obligation 
in order to establish norms outside the traditional means of policy making to fashion a drastic 
policy change. Furthermore, decision makers will have to overcome the uncertainty behind 
making dramatic changes.42 With these conditions being met, Gersick argues that the next phase 
is the revolutionary phase. During a revolutionary phase, the systems that are internally routed 
structures are briefly shaken. Two ways in which Gersick argues that the systems are shaken is 
from “(1) internal changes that pull parts and actions out of alignment with each other or the 
environment and (2) environmental changes that threaten the system's ability to obtain 
resources.”43 Based on this action groups refocus and create different solutions to established 
problems that are measured through punctuations. The departure enables new players, in 
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particular new members, within a given policy making realm to alter the system in a way a 
lifetime worker may not.44 After revolutionary periods fashion new methods of approaching 
problems, the group shall either adopt the new method or resort to the old method of decision 
making based on the perceived success of revolutionary period program. A given program will 
thus return to a period of equilibrium.
 Understanding how punctuated equilibrium theory works with incrementalism, there are 
a variety of examples given in the history of American politics that use a combination strategy. 
Baumgartner and Jones discuss how monopolies and small groups within the larger political 
system transform the view of the need for a nuclear program. In particular, the idea of public 
portrayal is crucial to the influence of a monopoly creating punctuations; they argue that, “[t]he 
degree to which problems are tightly linked to images is related to the degree to which a single 
arena of policymaking exerts monopolistic control over a policy.”45 Baumgartner and Jones look 
at the historical development of “the nuclear power industry in the United States, government 
and industry leaders were able to create an impressive and seemingly all-powerful 
subgovernment favoring the industry as it grew and developed after World War II.”46 Due to a 
favored industry perpetuating the need for a strong nuclear power in conjunction with 
contemporaneous world events, the specific committees discussing the growth were able to 
allocate larger amounts of money towards programs through altered public opinion. In this sense, 
this is a new method of how to understand nuclear allocations through punctuations in policy 
ideas. Further, “[c]hanges in policy images facilitate changes in venue assignment. Changes in 
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venue then reinforce changes in image, leading to an interactive process characterized by 
positive feedbacks, which can lead to dramatic results.”47 In conjunction with Gersick’s phases, 
the nuclear power advocates successfully broke through the barriers to enter a revolutionary 
period, which was later accepted as the new norm of decision making with nuclear power. 
 Another American example which highlights the use of tobacco monopoly overcoming 
the actions of health based initiatives to maintain the ability of the companies to make a profit. 
Givel investigates the period from 1993 to 2000 when health advocates began championing the 
idea that tobacco should be reduced due to particular health risks. The tobacco industry was 
opposed to tax increases on sales of their product for financial reasons and openly agreed to 
“comprehensive state anti-tobacco programs favored by the tobacco industry.”48 While health 
based advocates continued to change the image of smoking in the public, due to the strength of 
the tobacco monopoly and lobbying resources, they were “able to generally keep state tobacco 
taxes low and counter significant regulatory threats to tobacco sales.”49 Thus, while there was a 
punctuation in the desire to increase taxes based on the image and health side, the tobacco firms 
were capable of combatting the punctuation and were not required to alter their strategies to 
prevent  the harmful implementation of policy toward the tobacco industry.50 In this particular 
case, the punctuation was the public opinion falling out of favor with the tobacco company. 
However, due to the strength of the particular business, the tobacco company was able to use 
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institutionalized tactics to prevent a massive policy change. Policy in this sense was forced to 
change slowly due to the factors of the punctuation alinging with incrementalism. 
 While there are many examples of punctuation-equilibrium theory in conjunction with 
incrementalism in American political science, is it possible to use these strategies in a global 
sense? Baumgartner answers in the affirmative, saying that, “different countries will display 
certain common characteristics based on the limitations of human cognition and that these 
similarities will be more prominent that whatever institutional differences may also be present.”51 
The United States government is fashioned to react with punctuations from exogenous forms, 
and parliamentary systems, which are used in Botswana and South Africa, are supposed to reflect 
the opinion of the majority party.52 Thus, applying both incrementalism and punctuated-
equilibrium theory onto the cases of Botswana and South Africa’s policy development of co-
infection policy is valid, due to the fact that the parliamentary system is supposed to respond to 
the desires of the citizens. Further, it is important to remember that while there are benefits to the 
use of punctuated equilibrium theory, however, it will not help us make specific predictions for 
particular policy issues.”53 Essentially, in order to apply the above techniques, a historical 
approach will be required and subsequently will not attempt to create predictions as these models 
are limited by their structure, in conjunction with international recommendations. 
 Knowledge of incrementalism and punctuation equilibrium theory will help understand 
the process of state policy creation. Now there is a need to understand how norms are created in 
a world of global interdependence, which is best described through international regime theory. 
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International Policy Theories: International Regime Theory
 Growing global interdependence has significantly altered world politics and how issues 
of security, economic stability, and health are constructed and subsequently implemented in 
various policy realms. With the increase in interconnectedness, world issues are not solved solely 
through the United Nations but through a variety of governmental entities. Robert Keohane and 
Josephe Nye, in their discussion of politics in an arena of dependence claim that, “[i]nternational 
organizations help to activate potential coalitions in world politics.”54 Activating coalitions 
enables political entities and government representatives to come together and discuss issues 
beyond their domestic boarders. In doing so, information and collaboration assist in the 
establishment of new political regimes aimed at enhancing global plans to combat against issues 
including HIV/TB co-infection.
 In order to investigate the role of global regimes it is important to establish a cohesive 
definition of a regime. Stephen Krasner describes regimes as, “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.”55 In particular, principles, norms, rules, and 
decision making procedures are decided upon in order to establish a method to combat a specfic 
political issue. Krasner further defines what each of the individual units of a regime consist of:
 Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
 defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
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 proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
 and implementing collective choice.56
Considering these units, regimes fashion a political system which, “tak[es] place entirely outside 
the jurisdictional boundaries of sovereign states.”57 A regime consists of international 
representatives of sovereign states interacting and fashioning a system to discuss and formulate 
recommendations on issues in the global arena. Now with the understanding of the components 
involved in a regime it is crucial to understand how regimes emerge in world politics. 
 Regimes, like other political institutions, are entities that require groups of 
representatives or states to come together and develop a structure to incorporate principles, 
norms, rules, and decision making procedures; however, most rational actors would not enter 
into an institution that risks harming the state. Keohane argues that, “[r]egimes are developed in 
part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to 
make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain.”58 
Since regimes are initiated in order to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome states, in 
considering their own stance in global politics, that regimes emerge from an agreed upon use of 
collaboration. Further, in considering individual reasons for the creation of regimes “[t]he most 
prominent in this volume are egoistic self-interest, political power, norms and principles.”59 
Entering into a regime enables individual states to improve their standing in global politics and 
gain advantages of other states in combatting political problems that are difficult to influence 
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without outside guidance. Individual states, in turn, are able to be active members in regimes that 
enable them to obtain resources outside domestic resources, in hopes of aiding in a global 
initiative to conquer an issue, including HIV/TB co-infection. 
 Beyond an individual desire of states to enter into regimes, Young explores three 
processes by which the development of regimes occurs in international politics; through 
spontaneous, negotiated, and imposed orders, regimes become salient forms of political decision 
making. Spontaneous orders are instances where many representatives through cooperation are 
able to create conventions that members states will be able to follow.60 While these types of 
agreements are not understood with cooperation models, there is an inherent cohesiveness of 
social conventions from these collaborative regimes. From spontaneous orders, it is difficult to 
understand the reasons behind their emergences, however, they are able to enhance contributions 
to “the welfare of large groups in the absence of high transaction costs or formal restrictions on 
the liberty of the individual participant.”61 In turn, while these orders’ genesis are not as 
calculated as other types, the benefits for individual actors enable the continuance of the decided 
upon conventions and processes. 
 Unlike spontaneous orders, negotiated orders require participants to discuss and come to 
a consensus in terms of norms, principles, rules, and decision-making processes.62 Through this 
type of organization, different parties are able to create institutions that engage all members and 
thoroughly contemplate the specific details of the regime structure to ensure information flow 
and proactive actions. Due to the method by which negotiated orders are achieved, these orders 
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are prevalent in the international political system.63 In understanding the international political 
arena, bargaining models help to describe the actions that take place and subsequently help to 
explain the final decisions of the group. Negotiated orders give many actors, from a variety of 
places on the international power spectrum, to engage and formulate a regime to guide and shape 
prevalent issues. 
 Finally, imposed orders serve as a method for dominant powers to establish desired 
requirements of regimes, that in turn help perpetuate their norms and principles. In these orders, 
there is a clear distinction between the hierarchy of states. Thus, “[o]vert hegemony occurs when 
the dominant actor openly and explicitly articulates institutional arrangements and compels 
subordinate actors to conform to them.”64 For regimes that emerge from this process there is 
often an underlying sense that the four elements replicate norms and principles of the powerful 
state initiating the order. Hira mentions that, “[s]ome analysts suggest that a hegemonic power is 
needed to maintain as well as create international regimes.”65 Imposed orders play into the power 
roles in international politics, however, there are alternative avenues to achieve cooperation and 
development of structures that enhance global efforts in issues such as health. Through these 
three processes of orders the creation of regimes, alongside enhancing mutually benefits, one is 
able to outline regime creation of any kind.
 While the above discussion explains the method of regime emergence, regimes are not 
stagnant entities that do not evolve and change with time, similar to copious issues in world 
politics. First, not all regimes are perfect from the beginning and they “harbor internal 
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contradictions that eventually lead to serious failures and mounting pressure for major 
alterations.”66 Changes enable the regime to function better and subsequently achieve the desired 
goals as prescribed in the discussion of the organization. Further, alterations in the power 
structure of the international order influence regime change.67 As with power changes on a 
domestic level, the focus and goals of a particular regime are susceptible to adaptation based on 
new desired goals of leaders. According to Young, “[c]hanges in the characteristics of the 
international system will alter the opportunity costs to actors of various courses of action, and 
will therefore lead to changes in behavior.”68 Finally, the most important influence comes from 
exogenous forces. Technological innovation massively alters how specific problem areas are 
tackled.69 For example, vaccinations for particular communicable diseases have enabled regimes 
to take new stances and create new processes for combating the disease, as seen with the 
eradication of smallpox. From this regimes learn how to integrate new elements and global 
changes into the given regime. Hass defines learning as “merely means solving the problems of 
imperfect markets more efficiently.”70 Appreciating the fact that regimes are fluid and capable of 
change helps to communicate why states choose to be active and involved members in 
organizations focused around a global topic.
  States are sovereign actors in world politics and are awarded the power to dictate actions 
that the state will take to preserve themselves; however, states interact on the international scale 
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in organizations. Why are regimes attractive to states? One key advantage to regimes is the 
available information and the flow of information that emerges from cooperation. With a variety 
of states engaging in research and policy recommendations states are able to decide and learn 
what would be best in their individual area. Haas says, “[l]earning itself is part of the interplay 
between studying and doing. It depends on what bits of consensual understanding exist at any 
one time about the links between politics, culture, and biology; and we know that the bits keep 
changing.”71 For instance, medical development cannot be supported by all states in the same 
capacity. If a lesser-developed-state is able to gain information from a state on treatment of 
malnutrition without extensive experimentation, the benefits are extraordinary. In turn, states are 
able to gain new information through extensive communications, and are thus able to create 
policy that reflects the new information to the benefit of the state’s citizens.72 Without the 
information, individuals would continuously be replicating similar experiments and repeating 
previously discovered negative outcomes. The element of information sharing is a major 
advantage that states use when involved in regimes and this information is further established 
through cooperative means.
  Cooperation is advanced through regimes by the inherent methods by which they are 
formed from agreed upon ideas and processes to make decisions and interpret information. Due 
to this fluid nature, interests designed in the regime are able to be altered and “will result in 
different processes and in a variety of regimes that will be considered rational by the actors-at 
least for a while.”73 With the availability of cooperation from the establishment and ability to see 
30
71 Haas, 208.
72 Duncan Snidal, “Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and 
Regimes,” The American Political Science Review 79 no. 4 (1985): 931.
73 Haas, 241.
interest change, states are able to ensure input to benefit their stance domestically. Further, as 
Duncan Snidal explores in his article, “Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for 
International Cooperation and Regimes,” the game play is able to be altered by extending the 
time, number of players, and number of opportunities to cooperate. Regimes not only create 
opportunities to cooperate or defect but also, “achieve intermediate levels of cooperation in 
circumstances in which they are unwilling to risk complete cooperation.”74 The ability to expand 
the options of cooperation helps to enable all states to contribute to the extent that their resources 
allow. In this sense, even less-developed-states are able to contribute to the regime without being 
forced to contribute beyond their means. In this sense, regimes offer strong cooperation 
infrastructure, empowering all states to engage in international political issues.
 Finally regimes allow for an establishment of patterns of global governance. Anial Hira 
discuses how regimes are capable of establishing channels to govern particular problems. Hira 
intentionally “points out that the interactions and interrelationships between global actors occur 
not just on the state level, but across borders from the local and subnational levels as well.”75 
Due to a highly globalized world, looking at issues beyond domestic borders is necessary for 
complete comprehension. Regimes, having established information transmission and cooperation 
as key elements for states to participate, lend themselves to being agents of forming global 
governance. Further, Keohane adds that, “[r]egimes can make agreement easier if they provide 
frameworks for establishing legal liability (even if these are not perfect); improve the quantity 
and quality of information available to actors; or reduce other transactions costs, such as costs of 
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organization or of making side-payments.”76 With information and cooperation, regimes are able 
to formulate methods of how particular issues should be approached and place all actors in a 
better, agreed upon, technique to combating a problem. For example, the members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created a regional regime that formed in order 
to tackle the historical problem of drug production and use in the region.77 As a group, states 
were able to engage with participants with similar problems to find suitable solutions. 
Governance in these area required collaboration due to the fact that drug trafficking requires 
crossing borders. Governance, thus, is another advantage, alongside cooperation and information 
sharing, to engaging in regimes.
 While there are benefits to being part of regimes with a variety of focuses, such as trade 
and economic growth, not all regimes are the only ones in that particular issue area. Alter 
explores the concept of overlapping and nesting regimes in the context of the transatlantic 
banana dispute, which had no clear decisive body to determine whether or not certain producers  
received benefits not available to all banana producers.78 But what is the concept of nesting 
versus overlapping regimes. As Alter defines nesting as referring “to a situation where regional 
or issue-specific international institutions are themselves part of multilateral frameworks that 
involve multiple states or issues. Institutions are imbricated one within another, like Russian 
dolls.”79 Nesting is a way smaller regimes are created from larger ones. In this sense, it is easier 
to establish a small regime when a larger one already exists, removing the hurdles of negotiation. 
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Overlapping, on the other hand, emerges when a conflict falls  across different agreements from 
regimes, bilateral agreements, and other state based agreements.80 Overlapping, in the case of the 
banana dispute was important because it was crucial to determine who contained the legal 
legitimacy to judge and alter the trade conflict. Overlapping and nested regimes influence how 
actions are taken, especially when it involves using the decision-making process.
 Understanding how regimes emerge, work with each other, and why such agreements are 
beneficial to states, and looking at specific types of regimes outside trade and legal regimes will 
help to understand how health is viewed in this body of literature. The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) focuses on combatting the use and distribution of illicit drugs in the 
region. Jack Donnelly in his article set out to “examine the issue of international human rights in 
order to illustrate the utility of the concept of international regimes in noneconomic contexts.”81 
In terms of the human rights regime, it was a United Nations centered regime, whose norms and 
decision-making processes were determined with the UN and by the UN Charter and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.82 As with other states, the human rights regime is based on state 
based individuals bringing the desires of their representative state to the table. Crucial to this 
particular regime is that fact that this is an overlapping regime. Discussing the human rights 
regime it is necessary to look at the “several ‘lower level’ regional and single-issue human rights 
regimes, which might be considered as largely autonomous but relatively coherently 
‘nested,’ (sub)regimes.”83 By having subregimes, various human rights issue are able to be 
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discussed and focused on as opposed to only the rights considered to be the most important. 
Human right regimes open up discussion to how many issues are tackled within a regime that has 
no clear method of regulation. If human rights can be  debated and engaged in a regime setting, 
how about health issues? 
 Health, however, does not appear to have been placed into regime theory on its own; 
instead, health based issues are placed and discussed in analyses of trade and intellectual 
property regimes. One discussion of a health related topic in regime literature appears in an 
article discussing the Nestle boycott. In this instance, the company was accused of marketing 
infant formula in an areas where the use of formula posed potentially fatal risks to children who 
were raised on formula versus breast milk.84 From a public health perspective, the risks of 
“illiteracy, poverty, contaminated water, and the absence of facilities to sterilize and refrigerate 
transformed a product relatively safe in the First World into a potentially hazardous substance of 
the Third.”85 However, it was not a health regime that stopped the Nestle company, but a 
conglomeration of international organizations and transnational corporations that halted the 
company’s actions. In turn, the business codes determined by companies in conjunction with the 
WHO and UNICEF, fashioned a code which, when Nestle defied, became an instance to 
challenge a company to change their actions. Thus, a health regime, potentially centered around 
the WHO, only had limited influence in ending the Nestle boycott.
 Another example of a health issue being placed into the analysis of another type of 
regime is patents for drugs in the global intellectual property regime. The particular issue of drug 
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patents and affordability is a key argument in how communicable diseases are treated around the 
world. For example, “[s]pecial emphasis is placed on the relationship between global rules on 
granting and regulation of pharmaceutical patents and developing countries’ response to the HIV/
AIDS epidemic.”86While drugs are imperative in the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the developed world 
that invests time in creating and producing drugs wants to ensure they will have the patent rights 
are recognized on an international scale. For example, the United States became a key player in 
enhancing the enforcement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.87 In this 
sense, without the developed world being able to receive fiscal benefits from drugs, their 
companies will be unable to provide affordable and stable pricing for necessary medication.88 
Once again a health based conflict being altered and fixed in a non-health related regime; 
moreover, in a regime that is focused around trade and economic balance in North-South 
relations.
 Policy norms allow for individual states to gain information but the issue of funding 
particular polices often comes into consideration when adopting new norms. Donors often 
provide necessary financial resources to states to implement new programs; however, donors are 
not impartial in the political realm and hold political influence in the recipient state.89 Donors are 
outside political actors which, “include international or multilateral agencies, such agencies 
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belonging to the UN family, and bi- and multilateral donors.”90 While the donor agencies attempt 
to alter the course of the policy through donations, there is the risk that donor programs 
encourage policies that are not appropriate for the individual state, even through they are 
contingent with international norms.91 In response to this conundrum, the Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness was passed in 2005 to increase the “sensitivity among donors to the need to 
recognise how policies are made and implemented on the ground, rather than the usual ‘best 
practice’ mechanisms suggest in New York or Geneva.”92 While new leaps to have effective 
funding have arisen, donors still influence the policy decision making process through monetary 
influences and subsequent restrictions on spending the funds. Considering donorship along side 
government funding enables an understanding of policy shifts.
 The above discussion describes the prevailing literature and thoughts behind how regimes 
work, change, and in turn influence global politics. However, regime theory analysis has not 
been implemented on health based issue areas. Even though regime theory has not been placed 
on a large health based organization, The World Health Organization (WHO) stands as a 
potential regime to be the center of health issues in world politics. Furthermore, in a world that is 
consistently hearing of new emerging diseases, how can there not be a set up of a regime with 
nested regimes? In looking at the dates of most of the above articles, their publications were in 
the 1980s and 1990s, with one exception. One explanation for why health has not been analyzed 
in regime literature is the fact that currently health is situated in literature on global security.
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 In reviewing literature on health policy there is a shift from cooperation, for example 
regimes, towards formulating health as a security issue that needs to be tackled in the same 
manner as nuclear warfare. Security scholars have investigated the expansion of the security 
field, and commenting that, “[e]ven as the quest for security has become far more salient than it 
seemed to be during the early days of the post-Cold War period, it has become far more 
complicated than it was during the Cold War itself.”93 Furthermore, in a post-9/11 world, security 
has emerged as a strong salient issue in political science literature, especially with the growing 
threat of bioterrorism. In turn, there is a greater focus from both the political and public sectors 
on health issues around the world. Moreover, the growing attention has added the element of fear 
into the health realm, similar to fears of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics becoming a 
stronger military power than the United States during the Cold War. Durbak and Strauss 
comment that:
  [T]he challenges of making reality-based decisions for the security of global public 
 health are daunting in a climate of fear... An additional component for realistically 
 assessing a situation is the reduction of corruption and mendacious behaviours that is 
 fostered in a climate of fear94.
No longer is healthy living and the prevention of diseases seen as part of a living organism on the 
earth, but a possible mechanism for which enemies can inhibit security and the right to life. By 
using pathogens to induce fear, international security scholars have begun to question whether 
cooperation-based solutions will actually contribute to a global community capable of 
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responding to various health threats, which are a hazard to social stability. This scholarly shift 
has sparked research into the connection of health care failures and violent conflict.
 Regime theory offers the ability to understand how cooperation and policy 
recommendations are integrated in order to combat communicable disease on a global level. 
Simply saying that health is a security issue does not answer the question of how states 
eventually adopt international policy norms. Thus, if international politics are able to establish 
norms and methods by which states should hypothetically address domestic issues, why is there 
is no discussion on how these recommendations enter into policy making agendas in individual 
states? Emmer’s discussion of ASEAN points out that cooperation did not translate down into 
action due to particular issues in individual states, in turn, placing the objectives of ASEAN as an 
ideal, and not action. Even in his discussion, he determines that the problems are due to 
corruption, domestic pressure, lack of resources, training, internal politics, and weak 
institutions.95 While all of these issues, in his argument, harmed the ability of the policy 
recommendations to become implemented law, he fails to discuss how the recommendations 
entered the policy realm in the individual states.
 In order to understand how regime recommendations become policy it is necessary to 
explain first how the WHO is an international regime in the same way that the World Trade 
Organization is for trade. Secondly, investigating how policy recommendations are reported and 
entered into the policy agenda of individual states will give a new way to answer the question of 
why HIV/TB co-infection policies are not national policies in Botswana and South Africa.
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 With an understanding of punctuated equilibrium theory, incrementalism, and 
international regime theory, the exploration of policy translation can begin with a strong 
literature foundation. The following section addresses the World Health Organization as an 
international regime, followed by an extensive look at the norm changes in HIV/TB policy 
reports. Considering the above discussion on the theory, one can determine and apply 
international regime theory on the WHO and the organization’s response to HIV and 
tuberculosis. 
39
Chapter Three: The World Health Organization as a Regime
 The following section investigates the role of the World Health Organization as an 
international regime. The previous section outlined the means by which an international regime 
is to be defined, and this method will be utilized to argue that that the WHO is indeed an 
international regime. Subsequently, the norms of policy recommendations with HIV and 
tuberculosis are discussed to illustrate the change in recommendations on the international scale.
The Emergence of the World Health Organization
 As the international community shifted from the League of Nations to the United Nations 
system, there was a desire to create a stronger focus on economic and development issues. In 
1946, the Constitution for the World Health Organization was adopted in New York City, 
entering a new phase with a global focal point of diseases and health generally.96 The 
development of the organization lead to a shift from the concept of regional health agreements. 
One example of these health agreements was the Pan-American Sanitary Organization in the 
Americas.97 The regional health administrations were focused on regional issues; however, they 
were unable to solve health problems because health issues required global support. For 
example, the smallpox eradication process required that the United States and the Soviet Union 
work together to provide the medication and financial support to completely eradicate the 
disease.98 The particular emergence of the WHO, as Sharp declared in 1947, was “likely to be a 
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landmark in the history of international cooperation for public health and medicine.”99 
Cooperation expansion through health issues expanded the role of each individual state in 
fighting global pandemics.
 The expansion of individual state’s involvement in global disease provided both positive 
and negative abilities for states in terms of achieving their state’s interest in health. One of the 
massive benefits was the concept of information sharing among the states. Information sharing 
“provides tangible evidence that nations have found it mutually advantageous to extend their 
collaboration on world health in a systematic and regularized manner.”100 The contemporaneous 
sharing of information enables the World Health Organization to construct coherent policy 
recommendations suitable in a variety of socio-political situations. While the availability of 
information sharing is plausible, Allen argues that there may be some difficulties in finding 
consensus among states. He argues that the consensus in combating diseases “is vulnerable to 
those deep political and ideological cleavages that affect the whole range of international 
relations.”101 International relations for one particular issue are interconnected with relationships 
and actions spawning from other issue arenas. The health aspect adds to an arena where more 
politics will emerge, and in turn, will be influenced by other national interests of states. 
 Considering the potential benefits and downsides of the consolidation of regional health 
agencies, the recent history has shown that the World Health Organization has provided immense 
support, especially in policy recommendation and creation. Policy creation is fashioned through 
a variety of meetings and investigations which maintain “a steady information flow, and keep the 
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issue on the policy agenda.”102 However, the policy arena does not tack general health as an issue 
but by focusing on individual diseases. For example, as early at the late 1980s individuals 
writing about AIDS demanded that immediate focus on surveillance was necessary.103 As the 
demand for global cooperation grew the World Health Organization responded by “directing and 
coordinating the global effort against AIDS. Multinational organizations such as the European 
Economic Community have supported AIDS control in developing countries, as have many 
international assistance agencies.”104 These coordination measures focused on one disease 
created a sub-regime within the greater health regime focusing on AIDS. In turn the facilitation 
of AIDS defense and treatment turned the program into a nested issue. Thus, AIDS became an 
intricate part of striving for greater health of the global populous. The nested issue of HIV/AIDS 
led to a massive amount of research, both scientific and social, to create policy recommendations 
for individual patients. Nested disease programs are key parts of the World Health Organization 
and influences global policy as an international regime. 
The World Health Organization as a Regime
 In terms of international politics, the UN system has provided a variety of important 
methods of sharing information and discussing particular problems that spread beyond individual 
state borders through international regimes.105 The World Health Organization is referred to as 
being a part of the UN system, meaning that the ideas and formulation of this organization is in 
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line with the desires of the United Nations Charter. The UN Charter in Article 55 introduces the 
ideas that the general well-being of citizens is crucial to facilitating “peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples.”106 In particular the Charter calls for the promotion of:
1. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development;
2. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and
3. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 	
freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.107
Health and social problems remain at the forefront of thought of the United Nations developers, 
moving away from the purely security focused League of Nations. In the following years, 
however, the World Health Organization was created to work within the system established in the 
charter to promote global health initiatives. 
 The World Health Organization is indeed a key player in the United Nations system, 
however, the WHO is an international regime with key principles, norms, rules, and decision 
making procedures. The Constitution of the World Health Organization helps to define these 
features. In the opening part of the document, specific principles are stated, including the ones 
presented below:
• Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.
• The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition.
• The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is 
dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States.
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• The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of health is of value to 
all.
• Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of 
disease, especially communicable disease, is a common danger...
• Governments have a responsibility for the health of their peoples which can be fulfilled 
only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.108
These principles reveal an organizational desire to ensure health, in all forms, to all individuals. 
These principles act as goals that, through cooperative measures, the organization will strive to 
achieve. The above principles address the need for a global response to communicable diseases. 
Due to the way that most diseases are passed from human to human, there is no way for an 
individual state to combat a disease without the help of international neighbors. Further, the 
concept of  “unequal development” is important in addressing global diseases. Taking into 
consideration the variation among medical facilities throughout the globe is necessary because 
there is no way to transplant the best medical treatment without a system of sustainable 
development. The treatment of diseases must include the consideration of non-development 
medical facilities. The above principles help define this international regime that focuses on 
implementing methods for treating disease on a global scale with the understanding of 
international differences. 
 The constitution not only includes an outline of the principles of the regime but also 
includes rules of how membership and decisions will be facilitated. The rules first establish the 
membership of the WHO. Articles 3 and 4 explain that membership is universal, meaning “open 
to all States.”109 While every state is entitled to membership, each state is required to make “a 
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financial contribution based on the UN formula of population size and gross national product.”110 
These articles establish that the members will be financially involved with the actions of the 
WHO and ensure that all states are donating an appropriate amount of money to the organization. 
Beyond membership, Articles 9 through 13 establish the structure and meeting times of the 
organization. In terms of the structure, there is “a) The World Health Assembly...; b) The 
Executive Board...; c) The Secretariat” and these groups shall consist of delegates from member 
states.111 Further, each state will have a delegation consisting of no more than three people.112 
Establishing these rules ensure that members have consistency and understand the structure of 
the organization. The fashioned structure allows for the procedures for decision making to be 
consistent and flow to create suitable recommendations to member states.
 The procedures for decision making are also outlined in the constitution, in conjunction 
with the structure of the organization. Articles 21 through 23 describe the ability of the Health 
Assembly to “adopt regulations concerning”:
 (a) sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the 
 international spread of disease;
 (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public health practices;
 (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use;
 (d) standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical 
 and similar products moving in international commerce;
 (e) advertising and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in 
 international commerce.113
The assembly thus can work with member states to ensure that proper technologies are being 
transported from states that produce the technology to the underdeveloped states. Importantly, 
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pharmaceuticals can be discussed, helping to lower the cost, and to spread the recommendations 
of successful treatment methods to all member states. Beyond the assembly, Article 28 outlines 
the role that the Board plays in decision making for the organization. One of the most important 
roles is “to act as the executive organ of the Health Assembly.”114 As the core group of the 
organization, the Board is able to make decisions in emergency decisions, plan agendas, and 
discuss agreements and regulations.115 The organization is thus similar to the General Assembly 
and the Security Council in the United Nations. The interaction of the Board and the Assembly 
are dictated by the members and form a consistent method to making decisions on global health 
issues. 
 The decision making procedures ensure that the rules are followed and the principles are at 
the focal point of decision making. The fourth element to international regimes are the norms 
that are created through the principles, rules, and decision making. In terms of the WHO, the 
norms emerge through the policy recommendations for each disease. Over time, these policies 
shift, based on scientific and social research of what works in treating the various diseases. The 
norms of HIV and tuberculosis will now be explored to illustrate the change from treating the 
two disease separately to treating the co-infection together. The policy changes remain the focus 
of norms within the international regime of the World Health Organization.
HIV Policy Norms:
 The World Health Organization has been an active group in responding and integrating 
research into coherent recommendations to help individual states combat the HIV epidemic. 
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Scientific innovation and social science research has allowed for changing norms to strengthen 
the response to the epidemic. Analysis of the various treatment recommendations over the past 
13 years reveals how dynamic the WHO is in responding to new evidence in successful treatment 
measures.
 The initial stages of treatment recommendation for HIV was through surveillance, similar 
to surveillance for other STIs (Sexually Transmitted Illnesses). In starting surveillance, this norm 
was intended to “provide practical guidance for ministries of health to obtain surveillance data on 
STIs to directly facilitate disease control efforts at national, regional and local levels.”116 The 
surveillance program included case reporting, STI prevalence assessment and monitoring, 
antimicrobial resistance monitoring assessment of syndromes, and special studies on the 
particular manifestations of the illness in the state.117 These particular strategies included 
expanding to regions with HIV epidemics to understand what populations are most affected by 
the virus. While these plans did not include recommendations on how countries should treat the 
disease, predominately due to the price of antiretroviral drugs in the late 1990s. Surveillance, 
moreover, would allow for classification of the HIV epidemic in the state as low grade, 
concentrated, or generalized.118 Further this would involve adding HIV prevalence to studies of 
STIs for stronger understanding of the disease implication in any individual state.119 Thus, during 
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the initial phases of the HIV pandemic the route of surveillance was highly recommended to 
states, and in particular developing states. 
 Following the initial states of surveillance, the 2000 report on surveillance required 
narrowing down and determining the societal behaviors that enable the spread of the disease. The 
report states that, “[s]trengthened systems, dubbed ‘second generation surveillance systems’, aim 
to concentrate resources where they will yield information that is most useful in reducing the 
spread of HIV and in providing care for those affected.”120 The “second generation” surveillance 
would enable individual states to:
• Better understanding of trends over time 
• Better understanding of the behaviours driving the epidemic in a country 
• Surveillance more focused on sub-populations at highest risk of infection 
• Flexible surveillance that moves with the needs and state of the epidemic 
• Better use of surveillance data to increase understanding and to plan prevention and 
care.121
With a focused view on the social and behavioral elements of the disease, education in these 
areas could be properly fashioned and implemented. It is crucial to remember that during this 
time drug development for HIV anti-retrovirals was only just beginning with few drugs available 
for patients. Further, these drugs were only being made available to citizens in low-income 
states. Thus, upgraded surveillance programs and educational programs became the means to 
help states attempt to prevent the spread of HIV.
 By 2002, however, the World Health Organization released a new recommendation that 
focused on the use of anti-retrovirals in all states. While the first wave of anti-retrovirals became 
available to patients with HIV in wealthy states in 1996, these drugs still remained out of the 
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price range of people suffering from the disease in developing states. In order for the 
introduction of ARV treatments, there needs to be “a clear public health approach that promotes 
the rational and safe use of these powerful and precious medicines.”122 Developed states used 
public health approaches that ensured the safety of those using the ARV treatments to ensure that 
the cocktails (or mixture of three drugs) were being appropriately distributed and followed. In 
order to ensure other states followed such a pattern, the WHO outlined a particular set of 
diagnosing and ARV implementation protocols in adults and children:
 • WHO stage IV of HIV disease (clinical AIDS), regardless of the CD4 count;
	
 • WHO stages I, II or III of HIV disease, with a CD4 count below 200/mm3;
	
 • WHO stages II or III of HIV disease with TLC below 1200/mm3.” 123
These stages are used to determine how seriously infected the patient was, and based on CD4 
counts, would determine whether or not to commence the ARV treatment. States were to use 
these stages and implement ARV treatment through the best of their abilities. Thus, surveillance 
was no longer the way to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic. From this point on, anti-retroviral 
treatment became the major policy push for states to implement from the WHO. 
 Once the movement toward ARV treatment was recommended, in 2005, the WHO 
stressed the need for the evaluation of national ARV programs. While it was important for the 
states with national ARV programs, “[i]t [was also] crucial to know how countries are meeting 
the agreed goals and objectives and how local levels (districts, regions or provinces, and health 
facilities) are monitoring progress and identifying any problems that they encounter.”124 The 
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WHO wanted states to understand their programs’ faults and alleviate them ensuring that the 
programs are working to help the populations that desperately need anti-retroviral treatment 
(ART). Based on information given from health facilities, and the patients seen in these areas, 
states would be able to make the appropriate changes, in conjunction with a focus on highly 
infected populations and populations with co-infection of other disease.125 While this particular 
publication did not dramatically alter the way HIV/AIDS was to be treated, revision and 
alterations are necessary in order to improve any program involving a virus spread effortlessly 
from one individual to another. 
 In 2009, another revision statement was released to ensure that the appropriate patients 
were receiving anti-retroviral treatment, including both first and second round treatments. The 
reason for the revision was based on the following principles:
 1. Do no harm
 When introducing changes preserve access for the sickest and most in need.
 2. Ensure access and equity
 All clinically eligible people should be able to enter treatment services (including ART) 
 with fair and equitable distribution of treatment services. 
 3. Promote quality and efficiency
 Ensure delivery of the highest standards of care within a public health approach so as 
 to achieve the greatest health impact with the optimal use of available human and 
 financial resources. 
 4 .Ensure sustainability
 Understand the long-term consequences of change with the vision of providing 
 continued,  life-long access to ART for those in need. 
 In this context, the individual rights of PLHIV should not be forfeited in the course of 
 a public health approach.126
States were again encouraged to ensure the equality and further focus on targeting the disease 
where response was most needed. In order to do so, states were required to make sure that 
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individuals were not being used as statistics in altering public health policies. Subsequently in 
2011, the WHO reinforced the idea that, “[t]he health sector encompasses organized public and 
private health services, ministries of health, nongovernmental organizations, community groups, 
professional associations, industries, research institutions, as well as other institutions that 
directly input into the health-care system.”127 Not only should the government be focusing on 
combatting health issues, but the economic and governmental processes as a whole. Anti-
retroviral treatment was pushed to be continued with contemporaneous engagement from other 
financial and social resources. Considering these particular recommendations, ART was further 
urged in areas that may not have the strongest programs available to citizens. 
Tuberculosis Policy Norms:
 Similar to how HIV programs and norms altered over time, the tuberculosis 
recommendations also incrementally changed as scientific and social research recommended 
alterations. In a 1988 report from the World Health Organization, the organization outlined the 
key focus points of controlling tuberculosis, which included social and epidemiological terms as 
defined:
 -social: to relieve human suffering by reducing morbidity and mortality cause by 
 tuberculosis;
 -epidemiological: to progressively reduce the tuberculosis in the community by 
 breaking the chain of transmission of infection.128
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Through these focus points the WHO further recommended that tuberculosis must not only be a 
program prompted by health officials but by community members.129 Community awareness of 
how the disease is spread was one method that was encouraged for all communities. Without the 
community encouraging medical treatment the program would have a hard time surviving. The 
WHO encouraged the medical community to use isoniazid treatment in developing countries 
because the success in patients in other states.130 This treatment is supposed to be given and 
watched by medical professionals who are trained and able to assess the appropriate amount of 
medication based on the severity of the disease. Developed and developing states proceeded to 
use the chemotherapy methods to treat tuberculosis until the DOTS program was presented. 
 In 1995, after various experimental trials of the program, the Direct Observed Treatment 
Short-course was presented as the way to combat tuberculosis in high burdened states. The 
DOTS program included five major elements of the treatment of tuberculosis patients:
 1.  Sustained political and financial commitment. TB can be cured and the epidemic 
 reversed if adequate resources and administrative support for TB control are provided.
 2. Diagnosis by quality ensured sputum-smear microscopy. Chest symptomatic 
 examined this way helps to reliably find infectious patients. 
 3. Standardized short-course anti-TB treatment (SCC) given under direct and 
 supportive observation (DOT). Helps to ensure the right drugs are taken at the right 
 time for the full duration of treatment.
 4. A regular, uninterrupted supply of high quality anti-TB drugs. Ensures that a 
 credible national TB programme does not have to run anyone away.
 5. Standardized recording and reporting. Helps to keep track of each individual patient 
 and to monitor overall programme performance.131 
This particular program shift created a decrease in the use chemotherapy but also shifted focus to 
adherence to a treatment plan. First, the financing and government support ensured that smear 
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microscopy was employed for patients who presented with any signs of tuberculosis, both latent 
or active. Instead of using the chemo-based isoniazid, multiple drugs would be used to combat 
the tuberculosis, due to the fact that most cases of tuberculosis are drug resistant to certain 
medications. Maintaining the drug supply is necessary to make sure that patients are able to 
effectively combat the disease. In doing so patients are able to be treated and states are able to 
understand the problem within their state. Implementing the DOTS program was considered to 
be the most effective way for states to tackle tuberculosis, and maintain information on the 
disease to be given in global reports. 
 Based on global reports of TB and the scientific understanding of how TB interacts with 
HIV, the WHO program began to create recommendations of how to integrate HIV positive 
patients into tuberculosis treatment. In the 1998 report the WHO and UNAIDS recommended to 
governments that:
 1) Preventive therapy should be part of a package of care for people living with 
 HIV/AIDS. 
 2) Preventive therapy should only be used in settings where it is possible to exclude 
 active tuberculosis cases and to ensure appropriate monitoring and follow up.
  3) Information about tuberculosis including preventive therapy should be made available 
 to people with HIV.
  4) Preventive therapy should be provided from within settings that include established 
 voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) services for HIV. 
 5) The priority for TB control programmes continues to be the detection and cure of 
 infectious tuberculosis cases. 
 6) The procurement and supply of tuberculosis drugs must be regulated by national 
 authorities, in order to prevent the development of drug resistance.”132 
The preventative therapy was recommended during the early periods of norm creation of 
tuberculosis treatment. In turn, HIV patients were to receive the chemo-based treatment and non-
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HIV patients the drug treatment. As stated in part 6, this was to inhibit the development of drug 
resistance, which was becoming a growing problem. Why this change? Based on trials with the 
multi-drug DOTS approach and the isoniazid, the trials found that DOTS was a more effective 
way of treating tuberculosis. The DOTS program became the leading recommendation from the 
World Health Organization with the STOP TB Program. 
 As the DOTS program was adopted by a variety of states, the problem of Multi-Drug 
Resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) arose in a variety of states, including South Africa and Russia. 
The emergence of MDR-TB was blamed on lack of oversight and implementation of the DOTS 
program. Suddenly, the WHO had to make recommendations that could be established in all 
medical arenas to prevent the increase in drug resistant tuberculosis. The WHO argued that, “[p]
revention of MDR-TB is achieved through the implementation and/or expansion of TB control 
under adequately structured programmes.”133 This particular report drew attention to the fact that 
drug resistance was becoming a growing problem. With the emergence of resistance the DOTS-
Plus program was created, varying the drugs used, including ones never used on TB before, to 
combat the bacterium that had evolved rapidly.134 As the tuberculosis burden continued to be a 
problem that increased with the emergence of HIV, this led to a strengthened desire for a 
program that became interconnected with HIV treatment. 
The Interconnecting Norms of HIV and TB Treatment: 
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 Based on scientific research and outcomes in developed states, the WHO created a 
treatment policy recommendation to integrate HIV and TB treatment. The growing co-infection 
burden of HIV and TB called for the statement “that HIV prevention and care should be a 
priority concern of TB programmes and TB care and prevention should be a priority concern of 
national HIV/AIDS control programmes.”135 No longer would these diseases be pursued 
individually by separate doctors, but together in one treatment facility. Further, special 
consideration would be necessary for HIV positive patients with active TB. This would be based 
on the ability of an HIV positive patient to sustain a drug treatment and fight the disease, 
measured by the CD4 count. Based on the previous research from the 2000 WHO report, the use 
of isoniazid treatment would continue to be used in HIV patients where applicable.136 Outside the 
hospital environment, community involvement in the co-infection community would be 
necessary for the success of the program. This particular report helped alter the path of HIV and 
TB, combining these two diseases from 2003 on. 
 In 2004, the World Health Organization subsequently released a clinical report on how to 
treat the two diseases together, aimed at medical facilities that had not yet adjusted to fusing the 
treatments. First, the report discussed how an HIV positive patients is ten times as likely to 
contract and be diagnosed with active tuberculosis.137 Medical facilities will have to ensure that 
the DOTS program and chemotherapy treatments are available to all patients. Also, hospitals 
need to assure that:
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 [E]ffective TB case-finding and cures, these interventions include: measures to decrease 
 HIV transmission (e.g. promotion of condoms, treatment of sexually transmitted 
 infections); highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART); TB preventive treatment; and 
 antibiotic prophylaxis against HIV-related bacterial infections.”138 
This clinical report stressed the need to begin to negotiate the two diseases together. Integration 
would not be instantaneous, yet the clinical outline became a manual to help physicians be able 
to understand the desired method of co-infection treatment
 As the year continued, the World Health Organization adjusted and refined the 
collaborative measures for HIV and tuberculosis. Tuberculosis was not the only respiratory 
ailment that HIV patients could contract. Based on this fact, it became necessary to report on co-
management to decipher whether or not the respiratory infection was tuberculosis or another 
disease such as pneumonia. The report created a step by step method to treating tuberculosis 
based on sputum samples, antibiotics, watching the patient, and deciding when it was appropriate 
to pursue a first line TB regimen.139 The co-management document also explained a variety of 
situations in which a patient may be diagnosed with either TB or HIV. Further, the document 
pushed for HIV testing in tuberculosis patients, and TB testing in HIV positive patients. As this 
interconnection was further hammered home, research continued to establish the connection 
between the two diseases. 
 Recently the WHO has released a report that focuses on the growth of research into the 
HIV/TB co-infection treatment. The current report argues that the 2004 report was somewhat 
incomplete and thus it became necessary to alter the policy guidelines. As stated “[u]pdated 
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policy guidelines were therefore warranted to consolidate the latest available evidence and WHO 
recommendations on the management of HIV-related TB for national programme managers, 
implementers and other stakeholders.”140 Based on the 2012 report, “[a] national coordinating 
body for collaborative TB /HIV activities should have clear and consensus-based terms of 
reference. The important areas of responsibility are:
- governance and coordination at national and sub-national levels;
- resource mobilization;
- provision of general policy and programme direction for the management of activities;
- capacity-building including training;
- ensuring coherence of communications about TB and HIV;
- ensuring the involvement of civil society, nongovernmental and community 
organizations.141
In order to create and implement these policies in a given state, it is necessary for government to 
set goals in conjunction with those established in the Millennium Development Goals.142 Further, 
individual states should work to find the best practices for their individual citizens.143 This is 
important because states suffer from different institutional and financial problems. Moreover, in 
order to achieve the goals, the previous initiatives are to be focal points for policy makers. 
 As the norm development reveals, HIV and tuberculosis have become diseases that can 
no longer be separated if both are to be controlled on a global scale. This particular norm change 
suggests that high burden areas such as Botswana and South Africa should adopt these medical 
recommendations on a national scale. The norm changes explored above will be addressed in the 
cases, in conjunction with public policy models, to investigate why Botswana has been more 
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willing to adopt these norm changes while South Africa has not embraced the international 
norms.
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Chapter 4- Botswana
 Botswana is commonly referred to as the gem of Africa with it’s economic success with 
diamonds; However, HIV/AIDS has negatively impacted the life expectancy of the average 
adult. The disease rate “fell from 65 years in 1990-1995 to less than 40 years in 2000-2005, a 
figure about 28 years lower than it would have been without AIDS.”144 In response, the 
government adopted a national anti-retroviral program that was initiated at Princess Marina 
Hospital, located in Gaborone.145 The program enabled thousands to receive the anti-retroviral 
treatment, expanding the life expectancy of the average Motswana.146 As explained in Chapter 1, 
the HIV spread of the disease was rapid and varied due to migrant labor and stigma of condom 
use. Coming from these particular challenges, Botswana has a very successful anti-retroviral 
program and tuberculosis program, which are in the process of integration. The program’s 
success has now been considered the African model to be used in other states.147
 What made the Botswana model effective? The government of Botswana has played an 
active role in fighting the virus and adopting policy norms dictated by the World Health 
Organization. Botswana has consistently taken the policy recommendations and created 
appropriate programs for the people in Botswana. The following explores how Botswana has 
successfully adopted these norms through their policy making arena. 
Botswana’s Political Structure
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146 The singular reference to an individual who is a citizen of Botswana. 
147 International HIV & AIDS Charity.
 Botswana’s policy making arena is a parliamentary system that is common in southern 
Africa; the system is a “multi-party parliamentary system, an executive presidency, and 
executive machinery dominated by a cabinet of ministers chaired by the president.”148 This 
multi-party system is considered one of the most stable democracies on the continent. Botswana 
however has an “advantage [that] lies principally in its largely homogeneous Tswana 
population... In more than forty years of independence, it has never had a change of government, 
and it has been ruled by one dominant political party.”149 While the BDP has maintained a 
majority since independence in 1967, under Seretse Khama, the country has continued to elect 
parliament members that have been responsible for electing the five presidents of the country.150 
Considering the parliamentary system and the sustained ruling of the Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) the figure 4.1 explains how policy is approved, in particular health polices with 
recommendations from the WHO. The key element here is that the representatives of Botswana 
present the information from various meetings to the Ministry of Health. By entering the 
bureaucracy the reports can then be discussed and considered. The process by which the WHO 
report goes from being a recommendation to a policy is somewhat complicated, and not as 
simple as voting yes or no. 
 The policy discussion first begins with the second tier on the chart between the president, 
bureaucracy and various non-governmental organizations. The president is chosen from the
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Figure 4.1
Botswana Policy Making Arena
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(Minister of Health in 
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(Currently Khama)
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Network of AIDS Service 
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National Assembly (Passes Bills)
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members of parliament with the slight notation that candidates for parliament, “must declare for 
whom they will vote at the time of their nomination. Since they are nominated by their party, this 
means they must pledge themselves to the party’s candidate for president.”151 Party lines are 
clearly drawn based on these alliances, which also influences who may be appointed to a cabinet 
level position. Once the president is elected, the president appoints his desired cabinet members, 
however, unlike in other states, approval is not required from parliamentary members.152 
Understanding the relationships between cabinet members, or ministers, and the president helps 
inform the policy process. Presidents in Botswana have the ability to sway the direction of 
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policy, especially crucial issues including HIV.153 The president meets with the cabinet member 
and discusses how the policy recommendation can be altered to be appropriate for Botswana. 
With such focus, the minister then uses resources both governmental and non-governmental to 
create a policy suitable for the state.
 Once a policy is fashioned suitable for the state, the legislation is then filtered to the 
parliament, in particular the National Assembly. The National Assembly holds the ability to 
approve policies, create laws, and approve budgetary measures and tax increases and 
decreases.154 This part of the bicameral parliament is where recommendations from ministers are 
approved and implemented in the state. What is the role of the second house of parliament? The 
House of Chiefs is considered the less powerful house whose “power [is] to advise the Assembly 
and the president on matters that relate to the interests and organization of the country’s 
tribes.”155 In particular, the House of Chiefs is designated to protect the role of the tribal and 
traditional society in Botswana.156 Thus the power to influence the state policy comes with the 
National Assembly. John Holm argues that, “[t]he Parliament’s role in national policy making is 
a fairly passive one,”157 and has been known to accept policies from ministries without 
confrontation based on Tswana culture of public agreement.158 There tends to be common 
approval of recommendations within parliamentary decision making.
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HIV/AIDS Policy Formulation and Tuberculosis Integration in Botswana
 Botswana’s consistent parliamentary system has enabled Botswana to be one of the 
strongest developing states in responding the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 1993, for example, 
Botswana adopted a multi-sectional response to the epidemic, combining economic, social, and 
scientific measures to prevent the further spread of the disease. Further, the adopted policy 
created the National AIDS Council:
 [W]hose membership will include senior officers from the various government ministries 
 involved in HIV/AIDS, representatives of key non-governmental organisations (including 
 persons with HIV/AIDS), representatives of the private sector, and private individuals who 
 have demonstrated a high level of interest, concern and dedication regarding the national 
 HIV/AIDS situation.159
This council ensured the oversight and furthering the ability of HIV policy to help prevent the 
spread of the disease and the stigma associated with it. This particular policy also implemented 
an education based program  and surveillance system including the promotion of condom usage. 
The education based program continued into the early 2000s until the World Health Organization 
started to highly recommending anti-retroviral treatment. 
 As global rates of HIV increased the World Health Organization began to see the benefits 
of ART, and that this recommendation was necessary in Botswana. After the first cases of HIV 
were reported in 1985, there was a dramatic increase in the infection rate among adults in 
Botswana during the 1990s, presented in Figure 4.2.160
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According to the World Bank, by 2000 26 percent of the adult population in Botswana was 
infected with HIV.161 Due to the massive increase in HIV prevalence “there was a major shift in 
policy, with Botswana becoming the first African country to introduce free ARV treatment to its 
population”162 At this point the World Health Organization was investigating and commencing 
the shift in policy norms to introduce a nation wide ART. Botswana was considered to be a 
pioneer, and subsequently donors, who had left in 1995 due to the wealth of the state of 
Botswana, began to help fund the national wide ART program.163 While Botswana became the 
poster child of the ART program, this particular shift was guided by the WHO scientific 
discussions on the successful experience of anti-retrovirals in the developed world. In particular 
President Festus Mogae is given credit for the strong support and rallying of the policy. In this 
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sense, Mogae followed in the footsteps of his predecessors in being a dominant head of state.164 
The parliament, ministry of health, and President Mogae encouraged the passage of this policy to 
enhance the well being of the state against the particular threat of HIV. By 2004, the combination 
of social and scientific methodology helped inhibit Botswana’s infection rate from continuing to 
exponentially increase. In an audit from 2004, Botswana’s National AIDS policy included:
 [The] prevention of HIV/AIDS/STI transmission; reduction of personal and 
 psycho-social impact of HIV/AIDS and STIs; mobilisation of all sectors and of all 
 communities for HIV/AIDS prevention and care; provision of care and support for the 
 infected and/or affected; and reduction of the socio-economic consequences of 
 HIV/AIDS and STIs.165
Like the combination of anti-retroviral drugs used in a cocktail for HIV patients, the government 
pursued an active, multilateral attack on the virus. As the 2000s continued, few political 
alterations would be as dramatic and would not match the success of the national program. 
 Although Botswana excelled in implementing a national ART program, Botswana still 
continued to treat HIV and tuberculosis as separate medical conditions with separate treatments. 
In the 2007 Tuberculosis Programme Manual, HIV patients are given separate treatment 
recommendations than HIV negative patients were given. However, the government of Botswana 
had accepted many of the recommendations of the WHO including the DOTS program and 
isoniazid preventative treatment. As the Director of Public Health Matsae Balosang wrote in the 
preface that:
  [T]he national guidelines on the management of tuberculosis with the help of the World 
 Health Organization and the BOTUSA Project of the US Centers for Disease Control and 
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 Prevention, with critical input from experts worldwide. The fundamental principle 
 underlying the material in this manual is that it is evidence-based.166
In this document, the director points out that international norms for treating tuberculosis play a 
major role in decision making in public health initiatives. In 1993, while the DOTS program was 
still in development, Botswana implemented the program, and helped to ensure that the treatment 
became the national method of treatment.167 The program became the main form of tuberculosis 
treatment and surveillance which, as presented in Figure 4.3, helped decrease the tuberculosis 
prevalence in Botswana. 
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Botswana was able to also execute the use of Isoniazid Preventive Therapy (IPT), which was 
recommended in 1998 by the WHO and UNAIDS.168 Backed not only by the WHO, UNAIDS, 
but also through BOTUSA, a Center for Disease Control program in the United States, research 
about the strength of preventative treatment was conducted and adopted by the national 
government. Based on research, “IPT can make a critical contribution toward reducing the 
burden of TB disease among people with HIV. IPT is a low-cost, relatively simple intervention 
that can save tens of thousands of lives.”169 Following norms helped the populous in Botswana, 
yet, the treatment of HIV and TB were still not integrated and would not be fully connected until 
years later. While the program integration was not automatically initiated like previous WHO 
recommendations, Botswana slowly worked towards this norm adoption. 
 So how were medical professions in Botswana to respond to a patient infected with both 
HIV and tuberculosis? Tuberculosis patients were still to follow the prescribed treatment of 
DOTS or the preventative treatment; however, “[f]or HIV-infected patients who have active TB, 
and who are not yet on HAART, treat the TB first.”170 While evidence proved that treating the 
diseases together improved the chances of stoping active TB, due to a strengthened immune 
system, Botswana floundered and did not integrate the programs immediately. A potential 
explanation for this was that Botswana saw remarkable results in the use of the DOTS program 
in inhibiting tuberculosis infection rates and therefore did not see the need to fully integrate the 
diseases. Further, as stated in the 2010 budget speech given by the Minister of Finance, the 
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“Government has started outsourcing some of the HIV/AIDS interventions through increased 
engagement of the Private Sector and Civil Society Organisations.”171 The focus during this 
period, after the global economic recession, was to encourage a variety of support from within 
society to combat HIV. As Botswana continued to face the two diseases separately, Botswana has 
taken an incremental approach to integrating the diseases.
 While the WHO recommended that integration occur in 2004, in Botswana this required 
the creation of a committee, known as the National TB/HIV Advisory Committee, to oversee the 
massive medical change. Integration would not be a simple process due to the fact that programs 
“evolved separately,” meaning there were few points of connection between staff and 
facilities.172 While the integration process began in 2005, state officials claim that as of 2012:
 Botswana is well positioned to address the TB/HIV epidemic. Strong political 
 commitment to combating HIV/AIDS combined with resource allocation, has led to one 
 of the most successful HIV programs globally. This provides a very strong platform on 
 which to build collaborative TB/HIV activities.173
The understanding of what is necessary to increase the activities has enabled the Ministry of 
Health to fashion policy guidelines pushing towards the complete amalgamation of the programs. 
The policy guideline stresses the key focus on creating a TB/HIV Technical Working Group 
(TWG), expanding “joint planning, supervision, budgeting, resource mobilization and resource... 
and wider implementation of TB infection control in health care and other settings.”174 Further, 
the “harmonizing” of the programs requires strength in training for both diseases and increased 
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medical information. These realizations, unfortunately, were not seen in the WHO 
recommendations in 2004. Botswana thus had to incrementally create a method of integration 
without the prescription of an international regime. 
 While the WHO proved to be a crucial asset in health policy formulation for Botswana in 
past experiences, the HIV/TB integration required the bureaucracy to make slow changes over 
time to coordinate the programs. As Lindblom described, the various governmental agencies, 
including the Botswana National Tuberculosis Program (BNTP) and National AIDS 
Coordination Agency (NACA), had to muddle through the difference and negotiate adjustments 
in their programs.175  In this instance, incrementalism helps to answer the question of why 
Botswana, which traditionally accepted the international norms of health, was slower to react and 
subsequently why only now the policy guidelines are working through the National Assembly. 
Further, the coordination of various organizations focusing on these two diseases required a 
massive amount of time. The method of coordination was finally outlined in the 2012 policy 
guidelines through a framework that included training, treatment facilities, and methods of 
reporting. The integration of these particular facets of the Botswana program for HIV and TB, 
thus required an extended period of time with small changes to eventually lead to the grand 
policy change. The program development thus required the parliamentary system and the 
bureaucracy to use a slower method of policy adoption than previous years. 
Statistical Answer: Botswana Infection Rate and Funding Correlation?
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 The progression of the policy changes appear to be incremental and a further 
investigation into the funding of the program provides another example of incremental change 
through budgeting. Governments and funding agencies can increase the promotion of treatment 
facilities and behavior education of different diseases. Susannah Meyhew argues that, “[d]onors 
(usually) are not neutral, philanthropic givers of gifts. Donors are subject to national and 
international political interests.”176 The following section takes statistics from government 
budgets, global aid, and infection rates of HIV and TB to determine whether or not there is a 
correlation between infection rate and budgeting. 
 Considering the relationship between infection rate and funding can further enhance the 
understanding of policy translation. One expects that if the infection rate of a disease increases, 
the that funding for health initiatives would also increase. Why would this be the expected 
relationship? In order to fight diseases, a variety of funding is needed to cover the costs of drugs, 
hospital equipment, employees in the hospital, and other expenses. Below a selection of the 
relationships are evaluated below and the rest are located in Appendix A. 
Governmental Funding
 Botswana’s government has played an active role in creating programs to fight against 
HIV and tuberculosis to better the health of its citizens. Government funding enables public, 
state hospitals to gain the necessary supplies to help an infected patient fight an infectious 
disease. Looking at Botswana’s public health expenditure and HIV infection rate, there is a 
strong correlation between the increases of infection among the adult population and an increase 
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of government public health expenditure. Figure 4. 4 presents the graphical form of this 
particular relationship. 
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The above correlation has an r value177 of 0.74 meaning there is a strong positive correlation 
between the HIV infection rate and public government expenditure. The government of 
Botswana appears to increase the spending as the infection rate increased. This particular 
instance matches up with Botswana’s historical pattern of increasing resources as needed. To 
gain a further understanding of this correlation involves looking specifically at the funding 
overtime. Figure 4.5 reveals that between 2003 and 2004 there was a massive increase in the 
amount of funding toward health expenditure. However, this was not a one time instance as 
punctuation theory expects, but a large increase that sparked further incremental increase. The 
financial data expands upon the idea that Botswana is more willing to accept international norms 
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due to the fact that in 2004, the World Health Organization was further pushing for national anti-
retroviral treatment. Moreover, the donors who began to return to Botswana, in the late 1990s,  
increased the monetary support of the program. For HIV there is a clear increase in support 
during the second half of the 2000. Is this particular measure consistent with tuberculosis? 
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Figure 4.6
 Tuberculosis is not as new a problem as HIV, yet tuberculosis in Botswana has increased 
as HIV prevalence has increased. When a correlation regression line was imposed on 
tuberculosis and public government expenditure there was a strong negative correlation of -0.89. 
This r value could mean one of two things: 1) that the government of Botswana could have cut 
funding to tuberculosis as the rate increased, or 2) that the Botswana’s tuberculosis rate was 
beginning to slow as funding did not change. In considering the integration program it is likely 
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that tuberculosis patients were being more readily treated and that the infection rate was actually 
declining due to medical efforts. 
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Figure 4.6
 According to the provided material, it appears that in terms of budgeting for HIV and 
tuberculosis, the government has increased government health funding with the increase of HIV 
infection, but decreased funding with the tuberculosis rise of infection. This points to incremental 
increases and changes over time, including the integration of the two disease programs in the 
state. While the tuberculosis numbers may not point to a positive relationship, one must consider 
that the relationship were tested off a statistic based of the public health expenditure that was 
taken from a measure of percentage of GDP.178 Further, it is necessary to note that the 
tuberculosis incidence rate has decreased since 1998, which is contingent with the introduction 
of the DOTS program in Botswana on a national level. Considering these factors, Botswana’s 
governmental budgeting follows the concept of incrementalist model through budgetary and 
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infection rate measures to explain the national policy to treat the two diseases under one national 
policy.
International Donors
 Another side of explaining this particular situation is to look at funding statistics. The 
following looks at PREFAR and the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria’s funding 
to the state of Botswana. First, while the American PREFAR fund has only been in existence 
since 2004, Botswana has been a recipient due to the high infection percentage of adults.179 
PEPFAR is a fund provided by the United State government to help states with high rates of 
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HIV in the world. Further, it is a, “historic commitment is the largest by any nation to combat a 
single disease internationally, and PEPFAR investments also help alleviate suffering from other 
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179 PEPFAR described in chapter 1.
diseases across the global health spectrum.” 180  Botswana receives funding for HIV programs to 
help address the HIV infection in the state (as presented in figure 4.7). The relationship between  
HIV adult infection rate and PEPFAR funding produced an r-value of -0.88. In this instance it 
appears that Botswana received less funding as infection rate increased. However, by the time 
that PEPFAR began to fund high burden countries, Botswana’s infection rate had begun to 
plateau.181 The government in 2003 significantly increased the budget on public health 
endeavors. The PEPFAR funding, thus would have aided in the integration process that began in 
2005. While the relationship is negative, this shows that there is a relationship between the 
infection rate and funding that argues funding is decreased with infection rates decreasing. For 
Botswana this would not be unusual due to the fact many of Botswana’s donors stopped funding 
the state due to the wealth of the state. However, PEPFAR is a bilateral aid source coming from 
the United Staes, subject to state budget cuts. Thus, HIV support in this instance does not help 
understand the incremental process of transition.
 In turn, looking at the Global Fund support will also help to answer the connection 
between funding and infection rate. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
was created in 2002 to provide support for states attempting to remove these three disease from 
their states.182 Performing a correlation regression line on tuberculosis and Global Fund support 
reveals a strong negative correlation with an r value of -0.95, meaning as the tuberculosis 
incidence increases there is less funding (Figure 4.8). This particular test however does not 
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include the change over time with the disease. Botswana has actually received more funding in 
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recent years, but the incidence of infection has decreased massively, in turn, creating a negative 
correlation. The funding from the Global Fund helps to ensure that the program integration is 
successful in conjunction with other international funding and governmental financing. 
 While the following correlations may not point clearly to an answer to the slow policy 
change, it is clear that Botswana has received a greater amount of funding as these diseases have 
persisted in the state. Further, the slow budgetary changes are contingent with the incremental 
policy changes made through the Ministry of Health. Incremental budget changes appear to 
increase how medical alterations are influenced. 
Conclusion: Botswana Follows International Norms, but Needs Incremental Policy Changes
 Botswana, although responding to most of the World Health Organization 
recommendations, has made incremental changes to integrate the National AIDS Program and 
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National Tuberculosis Program. Accepting these policy recommendations can be difficult for 
states, especially since they maintain their sovereignty over political decisions. Thus, Botswana 
follows a particular pattern of incrementalism in order to translate international norms into state 
policy. Botswana has widely accepted medical advice from other states for tuberculosis and HIV 
separately. By creating strong programs for the diseases separately, Botswana was able to curb 
the HIV infection and decrease the incidence of tuberculosis. The separate programs became 
strong independent program that required restructuring of the health system and nationals and 
organizations to ensure they would work together. 
 The budget correlations shows that for HIV, the government has responded as the 
infection rate has gone up, however, in the case of tuberculosis there is a negative relationship, 
meaning as the incidence has gone up, the funding has come down. However, as shown in figure 
4.3, the tuberculosis rate has been coming down during the integration process. In this sense 
while the relationship between the incidence rate and funding is negative, this relationship does 
not indicate causation and much be considered with the historic foundations.
  Government and donor funding helped the integration and increased medical treatment 
that was required for Botswana to initiate the co-infection policies. While the funding 
relationships reveal the same negative pattern as tuberculosis, the same falling incidence rate can 
help explain this non expected outcome. Considering the work of the government, for both 
policy creation and harvesting international donations, Botswana has been able to use the money 
to a drop in tuberculosis, and in a few years probably the HIV infection rate.
 While the rates of HIV and TB are still very high in Botswana, the government is taking 
international norms and forming them into appropriate state policy. However, the bureaucracy 
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and policy making infrastructure was required to work through the integration of the HIV and TB 
policies, not just simply adopting a new policy. While WHO policy integration seems 
instantaneous, the individual states, such as Botswana, must attend to the extensive process of 
integrating the programs, which Botswana is continuing to do with the goal of being fully 
integrated in the near future. 
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Chapter 5- South Africa
 South Africa, unlike Botswana, was unable to adopt international norms towards HIV and 
tuberculosis co-infection treatment. The epidemic claimed its first victims in 1982, during the 
ending stages of the apartheid.183 While the apartheid government began to construct a response 
to the virus, the massive political change inhibited the ability to the state to respond in a cohesive 
manner during the early stages of the infection. The historical transition from apartheid to a 
racially integrated democracy in 1994 offered a new structure for a populous that survived a 
variety of social and political segregation. With the historic election:
 The non-racial democracy is in its infancy and still requires nurture and development. 
 The next state, according to the government, is to work toward social transformation, that 
 is, to enable the great mass of disadvantaged South Africans to participate in the 
 embryonic democracy by providing them with the skills and economic wherewithal and 
 the social services they need to become contributing citizens.184
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The new democracy led by the African National Congress (ANC) had to rise to the challenge of 
reintegrating the colored and white population while stimulating economic growth and 
combating poverty, as explained in chapter 1, the society was also being infected with a rapidly 
spreading communicable disease.
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 On top of these particular challenges, the new government was challenged by  a rapidly 
increasing virus, as shown in Figure 5.1. The tuberculosis incidence rate increased in the same 
pattern as HIV, along with other opportunistic infections.185 The complex nature of the disease 
being spread throughout the population caused the government to take action through the 
creation of the Networking HIV/AIDS Community of South Africa (NACOSA) in 1991, and 
later the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) in 2000.186 Through this process the 
need arose for greater sustainable development in health services to address the HIV and 
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tuberculosis co-infection problem.187 The following chapter investigates how the structure of 
policy making arena and policy development reveals that South Africa has had a more difficult 
time introducing international norms into their national policies on HIV and tuberculosis. 
South Africa’s Political Structure
 South Africa’s political structure became an integrated democracy in 1994 when the first 
open elections were held proclaiming Nelson Mandela the new president of the state, altering the 
new policy making arena. The new constitution established a bicameral parliament with a 
president and cabinet who runs the bureaucratic departments. The interconnection of the 
parliament to the president and members of parliament creates a government that is dominated 
by one party, in this case the ANC. While party dominance is clear in the policy making process, 
each section of the government is awarded specific powers in the constitution.
 The legislative body in the constitution says that the parliament will consist of the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. The National Assembly is made up of 
members elected by the general public and subsequently represent the people. They represent 
their constituents by “choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive 
action.”188 This is the body that approves and discusses legislative measures to be taken up in 
South Africa. The National Assembly elects the president and the president then chooses 
members of the cabinet from the National Assembly.189 Further, the National Council of 
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Provinces which works to engage the national government’s policy on the provincial level. The 
National Council of Provinces participates “in the national legislative process and by providing a 
national forum for public consideration of issues affecting the provinces.”190 These legislative 
bodies are able to pass legislation on a variety of issues, including health services; moreover, 
these legislative measures are often influenced by the research of the bureaucracy of the 
departments run by the cabinet members. The constitution lays out the functions by which 
policies are to be adapted, however, the structure is susceptible to overarching strength of the 
executive branch.  
Figure 5.3 
South Africa Policy Making Arena
WHO 
Representatives 
from SA
President 
(Currently Zuma)
Department of Health 
(Run by the Minister of 
Health)
South African National 
AIDS Council 
(SANAC), Networking 
HIV/AIDS Community 
of South Africa 
(NACOSA)
National Assembly
National Council on 
Provinces
(legislation pass here)
82
190 Ibid, Chapter 4.
 Nelson Mandela was the first president under the new constitution and had the 
overwhelming job of creating a program to reintegrate the society. As president he had “to carve 
out a worldview for South Africa was to move the ANC away from its traditional populist and 
socialist ideas through a series of inhouse party discussions,” and show that the government was 
dedicated to the development of an integrated society.191 The ANC thus worked to create The 
Reconstruction and Development Program that was tasked with “[m]eeting the basic needs of the 
people essentially implied the provision of jobs, houses, water, electricity, transportation, 
nutrition, health care and social welfare.”192 President Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki was 
heavily involved in the construction and implementation of the program. As the program 
progressed the discussion of HIV became more crucial, especially with the discussion over anti-
retroviral treatment; however, this decision was further, argued during Mbeki’s term as president.
 Mbeki’s experience working with high policy deliberations of a variety of politics helped 
him during his term as president of South Africa. Mbeki, having learned how to work with the 
ANC, was able to integrate his ideology into the policy making realm. A newspaper in South 
Africa, The Star, reported that, “he works behind the scenes, patching together alliances of 
disparate ANC factions to produce a power base.”193 This strength was exemplified when Mbeki 
began to question the connection between the HIV and AIDS virus and the toxicity of anti-
retrovirals. He “first voiced his skepticism about conventional explanations of the aetiology of 
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AIDS in February 2000... By this time, Mbeki’s hostility to chair the South African medical 
establishment was quite evident.”194 The skepticism lead to a lack of focus on research and 
engaging in the international community in terms of combating the disease on a national level. In 
particular Lodge believes that historians will look critically at this particular element of his 
tenure195, due to the fact that this investigation into whether or not HIV caused AIDS, placed 
South Africa behind other states in the region in responding to the disease. Later in his term, 
Mbeki and his cabinet worked to create an anti-retroviral program suitable for South Africa. 
South Africa, after this policy hiccup, has slowly begun to create national policies to provide 
critical support for all HIV programs and tuberculosis integration.
HIV and Tuberculosis Policy Formulation in South Africa
   South Africa’s policy construction for HIV and AIDs has been less productive in some 
decades and very responsive in others. AIDS claimed its first two victims in South Africa in 1982 
and the government made few attempts to address the disease. One of the first moves the state 
took was in 1987 when “the government of the RSA (Republic of South Africa) responded to 
HIV/AIDS by issuing regulations that had the effect of adding AIDS to the list of communicable 
diseases. [Those] suspected or actually suffering of AIDs could be quarantined.”196 In this 
instance, South Africa, like most of the world, was just beginning to learn about the 
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characteristics of HIV/AIDS. As information about how the disease was spread and infected 
individuals emerged, the newly integrated democracy was able to respond. 
 In conjunction with international norms, including the World Health Organization, and 
the Center for Disease Control, the newly formed NACOSA (at that time it was named the 
National AIDS Convention of South Africa) was able to construct a national plan for the state. 
The 1994 national plan contained 3 main objectives to be adopted and guiding forces for new 
legislation:
 1. Prevention of HIV through a range of activities, which included education 
 programmes, communication and information, mass media campaigns, distribution of 
 condoms, improving accessibility to early detection and effective treatment of STDS.
 2.Reducing the transmission of STI and HIV through appropriate care, treatment and 
 support for those infected.
 3.Mobilising local, provincial, national and international resources against HIV/AIDS.
These goals proved to be strong goals, however, the political leaders of the ANC lacked 
information on the problems within the state. The Minister of Health at the time, Dr. Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, “[w]as insufficiently informed by the institutional and social realities of South 
Africa,”197 including overestimating the economic and human resources available to combat the 
disease. Due to the lack of understanding, the goals of the program were revisited in 1997, with a 
new expansion on attempting to address the program. 
 The new focus in 1997 was on how to ensure the government played a more active role in 
fighting the disease and enable the on the ground work in medical facilities to be successful. The 
key revisions to the initial plan included:
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 The need to heighten political leadership and public commitment (including assigning a 
 special leadership role to the Deputy President); to ensure prioritisation of responses to 
 the epidemic; Adopting a more inclusive approach to HIV/AIDS; Developing
 inter-departmental responses; protecting human rights of PLWHAs.198
These focus points became driving forces in the creation of a new plan that highlighted the above 
goals. Moreover, the government had to respond to the push from international groups to provide 
ARVs to infected members of the population. South Africa was capable of funding its own 
national ARV program, but in 2000 the effectiveness of the drug program came into conflict with 
the new president, Thabo Mbeki. As explained earlier, Mbeki “launched broadsides in 2000 
against the conventional intellectual foundations of AIDS health policy, questioning the causal 
relationship between HIV and AIDS, and positing the potential toxicity of antiretroviral AZT.”199 
Even with the opposition from Mbeki and his supporters, the creation of the HIV/AIDS/STD 
Strategic Plan for South Africa 2000-2005 continues with the help of SANAC to emphasize a 
new multipolar approach.200
 The five year plan from 2000-2005 focused on areas of health, research, and rights of 
individuals living with HIV. The four major priorities were prevention, treatment, care, and 
support, research, and human and legal rights.201 The focus on prevention and treatment included 
concepts such as preventing mother-to-child transmission, wider availability of volunteer testing, 
and expanded support in communities throughout the state.202 Moreover, this document drove for 
the increase of antiretroviral therapy (ART) for infected individuals. While these goals were 
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presented, South Africa faced issues when paying for the program costs. Even more damaging 
was that there “was a dramatic and worsening shortage of human resources in the public health 
sector, a shortfall that has been the Achilles’ heel of the biomedical paradigm.”203 In particular 
the amount of medical personnel in the state proved to be a hinderance to achieving all of the 
goals laid out in the plan.
 While the goals proved difficult, in 2007 another strategic plan was created for the years 
2007-2011. In this plan, the Department of Health and SANAC discussed how certain groups of 
the population were disproportionally affected by the disease due to a variety of reasons. The 
plan reported that:
 Whilst the immediate determinant of the spread of HIV relates to behaviours such as 
 unprotected sexual intercourse, multiple sexual partnerships, and some biological factors 
 such as sexually transmitted infections, the fundamental drives of the epidemic in South 
 Africa are the more deep rooted institutional problems of poverty, underdevelopment, the 
 low status of women, including gender-based violence, in society.204
While South Africa faced a variety of challenges with education and overall education about the 
disease, the strategic plan continued with the four main goals outlined in the 2000-2005 plan 
(which included prevention, treatment, research, and legal rights).205 Specifically the area of 
treatment focused on the expansion of ART in all individuals including children.206 The ART 
treatment, alongside other medical interventions, enabled the population to respond to the disease 
and reduce the time spent sick at home. This particular focus is also crucial in the HIV and TB 
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epidemic due to the fact that in order to effectively fight off the tuberculosis bacterium, one must 
have a strong immune system.
 Considering tuberculosis protocol separately, there has been a more consistent program 
that was not as affected by the transition of power because of the time in which the disease began 
to affect South Africans. In 1996, the World Health Organization and the Department of Health 
in South Africa conducted a review of tuberculosis control program. Unlike the HIV program, 
which was struggling at the time, some of the key strengths in the findings were the “excellent 
human and financial resources and health infrastructure” and “acceptance by provinces of the 
internationally recommended Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course (DOTS) strategy 
incorporated in the national policy guidelines.”207 While the government had responded to the 
recommendation of international norms, there were weaknesses to the program including 
visibility of the available treatment for TB.208 In 1996, there was a clear focus on how to treat 
individuals infected with tuberculosis. After this particular point the tuberculosis rate increased 
significantly in conjunction with HIV.209
 In 2000, an enhanced focus on the Nation Tuberculosis Control Program (NTCP) focused 
on treatment of infected individuals. The Practical Guidelines report stated to medical 
professionals in South Africa that the, “Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) 
strategy is the most effective strategy available for controlling TB, developed from the collective 
best practices, clinical trials and programmatic operations of TB control over the past two 
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decades.”210 In conjunction with the reinforcement of the effectiveness of the DOTS program, 
there was a greater push for a strong supply of medication, sustained treatment, and a consistent 
method of recording infection rates.211 In this year the key aims of the NTCP were:
 1. To develop policies and guidelines to ensure early detection and effective treatment of 
 TB in South Africa.
 2. To manage the strategic implementation of the Directly Observed Treatment Short- 
 course (DOTS) strategy to control TB.
 3. To evaluate programme performance and provide technical support for the 
 implementation of national guidelines.
 4. Raise national awareness about TB so as to increase early health seeking behaviour of 
 persons with TB symptoms.212
These particular goals continued as the main focus for the control program. In 2007, the 
Department of Health endeavored with a mission “[t]o prevent TB and to ensure that those who 
do contract TB have easy access to effective, efficient and high quality diagnosis, treatment and 
care that reduces suffering.”213 This mission was accompanied with a vision of having South 
Africa be burden free from the tuberculosis bacterium. However, this particular goal would 
require the integration of the HIV and tuberculosis programs. 
 Combating these particular diseases within the country is considered, “[o]ne of the greatest 
challenges facing post-apartheid South Africa is the control of the concomitant HIV and 
tuberculosis epidemics.”214 While the HIV strategic plans in 2000 and 2007 remark that co-
infection of HIV and TB is crucial to fighting the disease, the government of South Africa only 
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began to push for an integrated focus in 2008.215 In particular, on the provincial level, the 
Western Cape (where integration research was prevalent) was able to successful treat co-infected 
individuals with ARVs and preventative therapy.216 While advancement in the Western Cape is 
evident, there is still a growing problem in provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal, where hospitals 
are combating Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (MDR).217 What is the response on the 
national level?
 The National Strategic Plan for 2012-2016 responds to the provincial problems by 
becoming a plan to address HIV, sexually transmitted diseases, and tuberculosis. The holistic 
view shows that South Africa is indeed moving toward strong integration of these programs. The 
National Strategic Plan includes the following five goals of:
1. Halving the number of new HIV infections; 
 2. Ensuring that at least 80% of people who are eligible for treatment for HIV are receiving 
 it (at least 70% should be alive and still on treatment after five years);
 3. Halving the number of new aTB infections and deaths from TB; 
 4. Ensuring that the rights of people living with HIV are protected; 
 5. Halving the stigma related to HIV and TB.218
The increased integration is set to be delivered over the next few years. In order to achieve the 
variety of goals, “HIV and TB management must be mainstreamed into the core strategies of all 
relevant government departments in all three spheres of government.”219 In this sense, the 
programs will be effectively merged and overseen by the government to ensure the successful 
implementation of the desired programs. Moreover, the government is promising to play stronger 
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role through institution changes and transparency of the alterations made to adhere to the NSP.220 
As of early 2012, there was an initiative to integrate the program has become a massive focal 
point in the governmental policy making process. 
 South Africa’s slower response to international norms, however, comes with many 
skeptics of the states potential success. In a 2009 report, Karim argued that:
 South Africa is experiencing the world’s worst HIV and TB epidemics. The current 
 epidemic trajectory suggests worsening of both epidemics with substantial increases in 
 morbidity and mortality and the devastating impact of the premature loss of lives and 
 economic productivity. The intertwined epidemics of HIV and TB have exacerbated each 
 other and have been further compounded by the growth of MDR-TB and the emergence 
 of XDR-TB.221
Due to South Africa’s slow response to begin to integrate the programs, they face much more 
challenging problems including Extremely Drug Resistant TB (XDR-TB). The shift in policy 
proves to be a chance for South Africa to shake from the shackles of previous failure in order to 
reestablish the integrity of those infected by the disease. However, it is crucial to remember that 
South Africa still faces many social challenges, such as the stigma of condom use, which may 
prove to be an important factor into the success of the integration program. 
 South Africa also falls into a pattern of incrementalism in policy changes, as explained in 
Chapter 2. The slow evolution of tuberculosis policy came through research, including in-state 
research, and discussion over the validity of science. Incremental policy changes in this 
investigation are seen throughout extended periods of time. However, this is due to the manner in 
which South Africa creates policies toward the treatment of various disease. Fashioning five 
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years plans, while advantageous for obtaining desired goals, does not easily accommodate yearly 
changes in science or the international health regime. 
 While the slow evolution does not respond quickly to international norms, it may also be 
hindered during a planned strategic time, such as the national strategic program, by the 
punctuations discussed in chapter 2. Mbeki’s disagreement with the flow of international norms 
can be viewed as a potential punctuation to the policy arena.222 The discussion of the scientific 
realities of the disease and treatment created a period where it was difficult for the policy arena 
to continue making changes, and subsequently inhibited the changes seen during the 2000-2005 
period. After this plan, however, one can observe the changes made throughout the next decade 
to address HIV and tuberculosis together for those who are co-infected. South Africa is thus in 
flux as to how quickly the government adopts international norms created from WHO policy.
Statistical Answer: South AfricaInfection Rate and Funding Correlation?
 The following section uses data from a variety of sources including the World Bank, 
PEPFAR, the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria, and government spending data to see if 
there is a relationship between infection rate and the funding of health programs. One would 
expect that if the infection rate increases, that the funding rate would also increase, in order to 
actively respond to the disease. While South Africa has had a variety of difficulties altering, 
looking at the relationships between the infection rates and funding will hopefully expand upon 
the the argument that policies shift incrementally due to the nature of fighting communicable 
diseases. 
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Government Funding:
 The government’s ability to fund health programs effectively has been a continuous 
concern in South Africa. Funding for health is important, especially in reaching goals such as 
having a strong and consistent supply of tuberculosis and anti-retroviral drugs. In viewing a 
funding-overtime-graph, including both government spending and non government spending, the 
pattern appears to fall in line with the incrementalist pattern of policy alterations, which can be 
seen through funding. From figure 5.4 it is clear that the government of the Republic of South 
Africa has continued to spend roughly ten percent of its GDP (gross domestic product) on health 
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initiatives. While there are no major jumps, or punctuations, in government health funding, there 
still appears to be a moderate positive relationship with funding and infection rate in South 
Africa. 
 First considering the relationship between HIV infection rate and public government 
spending on health. The relationship between these two variables has an r value of 0.65, which 
reveals there is a moderately positive relationship between the variables. This relationship 
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matches up the South Africa’s focus to increase the resources available for those infected with 
HIV. Moreover, while there has been fluctuation in the government spending, there is  a clear 
focus on the government’s desire to strengthen programs for the populous as revealed in 
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the national plans over the last twelve years. While there is a relationship between these two 
variables, does it also appear so when considering the tuberculosis incidence rate?
 Tuberculosis incidence rate also reveals that government spending is moderately 
correlated to public government spending; however, the relationship is weaker than the HIV 
relationship. Figure 5.6 shows that the spread of points is much more varied on the lower end 
and higher end of incidence rate and spending. The r value for this particular relationship is 0.44, 
which is a moderately positive relationship this is much closer to a weak relationship. So what 
does this mean for tuberculosis? From this correlation and regression, it appears to have less of 
an influence over government spending increases than HIV. 
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 Considering the above relationships, there appears to be evidence that as infection rates 
increased with these two particular diseases, the government funding also increases. This 
statistical insight helps to establish the pattern of incremental response, matching the history 
discussed in the previous section. 
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International Donors:
 The government of South Africa appears to have funded programs based on the increased 
problem of HIV and tuberculosis in the state, but what about the influence of international 
donors? As discussed in chapter 2, donors have the potential to influence policy direction 
through funding programs that the state is unable to fund themselves. However, as previously 
mentioned, South Africa is considered capable of financing many of the health programs 
designed over the last two decades. This may help to explain why South Africa, even when 
considered a high burden TB country, has not asked for tuberculosis funding from The Global 
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Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Due to this particular action, the following 
relationships are only seen with PEPFAR and HIV and the Global Fund and HIV.
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 Unlike the government funding examples, the relationship between HIV and PEPFAR 
has a strong negative relationship. With an r value of -0.93, as infection rate increases, the 
funding for HIV decreases. This particular relationship is opposite of what one would expect, 
especially in areas where there is a massive amount of people infected with an easily spread 
virus. Figure 5.7, while only including a limited amount of points, reveals that there is a drop off 
in funding. However, the infection rate only is varied over four tenths of a percentage point, 
potentially influencing the amount of funding from PEPFAR to South Africa’s HIV programs.
 Adding to the relationship between PEPFAR and HIV, the Global Fund’s support for HIV 
programs in South Africa also has a strong negative relationship.223 This particular relationship 
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has an r value of -0.98, which is hard to argue that there is not a negative relationship. This adds 
that there is an exception between infection rate and funding. While both donor groups have this 
negative relationship, the funding as increased over time for South Africa, as 
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seen in figure 5.9. In the case of South Africa, while the funding relationship is strongly negative, 
it does not provide the full answer.      
 Thus, while the funding relationship between international donors and infection rate 
appears to be negative, infection rate and government funding has a positive relationship. The 
funding relationships in South Africa appear to be varied based on the given correlation 
regression lines. While this statistical analysis on funding and infection rate does not further the 
incrementalist argument, in looking over time at the funding, there is an incremental alteration 
over time, matching the policy changes in South Africa. Thus, incrementalism appears to play an 
important role in not only the policy making and budgeting allotments. 
Conclusion: South Africa, Slow to Integrate Policy Norms
 Considering both the chronological metamorphosis of the HIV and tuberculosis norm 
translation into state policy, South Africa has been slow to adopt the norms due to political 
influence from strong leaders and internal discrepancies among the infected populations. As the 
infection rate exponentially increased during the 1990s, there was less of a response from the 
government for HIV, but not tuberculosis. While the tuberculosis program was applauded by the 
World Health Organization, the HIV program was slow to evolve into a strong and sustainable 
national program. Moreover, integration of the two programs required much more understanding 
of the norms, as seen in the example of how the Western Cape province was able to prove that 
the integration program could be successful in South Africa.
 Taking into consideration all of the presented information from both the qualitative and 
quantitative investigations, incrementalism best explains South Africa’s evolution toward the 
commencement of HIV and TB integration in 2012. Understanding how the government went 
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through a variety of alterations during the beginning of the disease it is understandable that the 
incremental process was necessary. The new democratically elected government responded 
without massive punctuations in either policy changes or budget influences. In turn, South Africa 
is beginning to actively translate the international policy norms of HIV and tuberculosis into 
national state policy. This process is only beginning, it is impossible to know how long or 
successful the integration process will be in this state.
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Chapter 6- Conclusion
 Botswana and South Africa provide insight into how international policy 
recommendations can be incorporated into national state programs. While both cases are located 
in one of the most infected regions of the world, they have taken slightly different routes to 
integrating HIV and tuberculosis treatment. Moreover, the combination of policy investigation 
and statistical analysis of budgets and infection rates illuminates the translation of these 
individual states, and potentially other states on the African continent. Considering the 
similarities and differences in policy metamorphosis in the states helps to lead to an 
understanding of policy translation.
Similarities in Botswana and South Africa’s Policy Formulations
 Similarities in Botswana and South Africa reveal that governments require bureaucratic 
inspection and alterations to their programs to adopt international norms. What is the foundation 
of these bureaucratic norms? Referring back to the policy making arena, pictured in figures 4.1 
and 5.3 respectively, Botswana and South Africa are similar in that the legislature is not the main 
organizational body fashioning the policy in either case.224 Not only is the Department of Health/ 
Ministry of Health the only bureaucratic agency, but other national councils are formed to create 
national plans. For example, in Botswana the National AIDS Coordination Agency and the 
National Tuberculosis Program use their resources to help fashion programs for the populous of 
Botswana. Similarly, the South African National AIDS Council has become a leading member of 
the policy force working to create a comprehensive program for South Africa. In this particular 
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instance, the states have civil servants and other individuals actively working to create policy and 
integrate the programs into one comprehensive action. For both of these states, the bureaucratic 
influence is crucial in integrating the programs.
 Moreover, these states are susceptible to the influence of members outside the 
bureaucracy questioning or propelling programs forward. In the case of Botswana, Festus Mogae  
was an advocate for the creation of the National ART program, “MASA.”225 Mogae used his 
presidential influence to advocate that the Minister of Health, a member of his cabinet, initiate 
the program. Conversely, in South Africa, President Mbeki negatively influenced the ART 
program’s nationalization. His skepticism delayed the ART program by publicly arguing that the 
program was ineffective in treating Africans, and that ARVs were potentially toxic. These two 
leaders, who were chosen by the legislature, played crucial roles in when the ART programs in 
their states were enacted. In this case, the presidents along side the bureaucracy played major 
roles in determining the incremental course of action that responded to international norms.
 Beyond the influence of the bureaucracy and the president, the correlations between 
infection rate and funding proved to be similar. HIV infection rate and funding have a positive 
relationship, showing that these governments responded with budget increases as the HIV virus 
continued to affect large numbers of people in the states. Government resources in turn were put 
toward the provision of HIV treatment to contain the massive increase of infected individuals. 
While this particular relationship is expected, funding relationships for international donorship 
have the opposite relationship: As the infection rate increased, the funding decreased. 
Importantly, however, the funding from groups such as PEPFAR and the Global Fund did not 
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begin to become available until the early 2000s, after the governments began to respond to the 
endemics on their own. In both of these states, the influences of donorship and government 
expenditures have helped stop the exponential increase that was seen during the 1990s. 
Moreover, especially in Botswana, there appears to be a decrease in tuberculosis, showing that 
the monetary funding may be starting to help lower the burden in these states. In this sense, the 
monetary situation is similar in both of these cases. 
 The similarities in the political structure and the budgets for combating these disease 
reveal how incrementalism can be viewed in multiple forms. Both in the political and financial 
sectors, both states have incremental changes that led to a consistent amount of funding for these 
particular programs. Incrementalism, in these instances, explains the phenomena more 
effectively than punctuation equilibrium theory. In terms of punctuations, neither Botswana nor 
South Africa had one-time policy changes that were immediately retracted and replaced with a 
new policy. These states accepted policies and slowly made alterations as necessary. Further, 
when examining the budgets, there were no major jumps in funding that did not result in a 
constant increase. For example, in Figure 4.5 located on page 69, there was an increase in public 
government expenditure in the year 2004. Yet, this increase continued into the following years, 
making this jump not an example of a one-time jump in funding. Due to these reasons, 
punctuation equilibrium theory does not explain the policy changes as adequately as 
incrementalism. While they have strong similarities in the political structure and the budgetary 
action, they still vary in the areas of strength of the programs and the rapid or slow acceptance of 
international norms. 
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Differences in Botswana and South Africa’s Policy Formulations
 While their are similarities in how the political processes function in these states, 
Botswana and South Africa have varied program strengths through acceptance of international 
norms. Botswana has been very receptive to international norms, adopting many of the WHO 
policy recommendations within two or three years of each release. Botswana was one of the first 
states to implement a national ART program for all citizens in the state. In turn, “[t]he success of 
this treatment program has made Botswana an example for other African nations to follow.”226  
Implementing this particular program, which coincides with the WHO recommendations, shows 
Botswana’s ability to absorb HIV policy norms. Moreover, Botswana continued to adopt new 
strategies, including isoniazid preventative therapy programs.227 Since 2005, the integration 
process for the national programs for HIV and TB have followed the WHO recommendations. 
Botswana’s particular focus on and open acceptance of international norms is different from 
South Africa.
 South Africa has taken a longer to adopt international norms, both due to the skepticism 
over ARVs, and also the ability to conduct scientific studies in individual provinces that are able 
to test new treatment actions. South Africa’s ART program slowly developed from the two 
strategic plans between 2000 and 2007. Moreover, the program does not seem to effectively 
address all at-risk populations, especially pregnant women running the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission. As of 2011, many mothers were still spreading HIV to their new born children 
because education failed to focus both on ways in which mothers can pass the virus to their 
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227 Javid Syed.
babies.228 The South African ART program is not considered to be as strong Botswana’s, making 
integration much more challenging there than in Botswana. While the tuberculosis program was 
significantly stronger than the HIV program, integration poses many more problems in South 
African than does integration in Botswana. While there is evidence that certain provinces have 
been successful in co-infection treatment, transporting this success to all provinces is extremely 
difficult. The two provinces mentioned in chapter 5, the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal, are 
the extremes of HIV/TB treatment integration effectiveness in South Africa. The Western Cape is 
much wealthier than Kwa-Zulu Natal; monetary differences prevent the provinces from reacting 
similarily. Moreover, South Africa is still facing many challenges of economic and social 
development that interfere with the integration of the two programs.229
 While Botswana and South Africa have similar successes, the differences evince that 
South Africa has many more elements inhibiting a swift adoption of international policy norms. 
These particular inhibiting agents are focused in the recent change and transitional period from a 
non-integrated to an integrated racial democracy and a more decentralized method of 
standardizing medical policies. As explained in chapter 5, South Africa’s transition into an 
interracial democracy has slowed the process of adoption due to the rise of charismatic leaders in 
the ANC. Integrating into a new political system made it difficult for policies to be translated as 
quickly because not all individuals understood the extent of the HIV/AIDS or TB problem in all 
provinces. As the ANC continued to be the ruling party, also seen as the party of the new South 
African democracy, there were individual leaders who were able to slow the process of learning 
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by questioning the validity of HIV as the virus that causes AIDS. In this sense, the new 
democracy was learning how to run a country and simultaneously attempting to combat a 
massive public health epidemic. While the national leadership was attempting to address HIV 
and tuberculosis, the provinces were able to create policies at their own pace. According to 
Schedule 4 (which is a part of the constitution dictating what issue areas can be discussed and 
have policies formulated), provincial governments are allowed to create policies on health 
issues.230 This brings up the differences mentioned between Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal, 
which face different financial and social challenges within the provincial boarders. Due to the 
fact that provincial legislatures are allowed to create legislation to address health problems, 
provinces have enacted policies to treat diseases based on internal experience. Thus, South Africa 
not only learns from international norms, but also from different experiences within the state, 
making policy translation slower because of regional experience with a given treatment 
recommendation. The experiences of Botswana and South Africa reveal the potential to 
understand other states’ actions to adopt norms. Understanding the similarities and differences 
cultivate a more generalized understanding of policy norm translation, at least in terms of health 
policy. 
Final Remarks on Policy Translation
 The answer to the posed question of why have Botswana and South Africa not adopted 
these integration policies comes down to the fact that policy must be accepted through the policy 
making processes dictated in their given governmental documents. Botswana and South Africa 
are currently in the process of integrating these two massive programs. Botswana is much closer 
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to having fully formed national policies with completed integration because Botswana’s 
integration policy has been incrementally changing to ensure the programs are integrated 
appropriately and successfully. In the case of South Africa, the national government has just 
begun to fully integrate the two national programs starting in this current year of 2012. South 
Africa has now begun to accept the international policy norms that the WHO presented in 2004. 
While these programs have differences, the key to answering the question is understanding that 
policies must be accepted by the state governments and turned into national initiatives. 
 Understanding the process for health translation is important because diseases are 
becoming more and more lethal to societies. Societies thus need to ensure that appropriate 
policies are implemented, because citizens are not always aware of the latest medical treatments. 
While construction of the health sector is important, one must remember that:
 Most citizens come into contact with health sector institutions and personnel at several 
 points in their lives, many of which are highly significant. Because the nature of some 
 decision making in health involves matters of life and death, health is accorded a unique 
 position in comparison with other issues.”231
In this sense, it is the individual state’s responsibility to create positive policies that are the best 
suited for combating disease, especially endemic diseases in the state. In particular, treatment 
integration is becoming more necessary as many diseases affect the immune system. Considering 
the role of diseases that destroy the immune system in the modern global community, 
opportunistic infections are increasingly more influential in the international the medical 
discussions.
 While the medical field is constantly changing, international cooperation is vital because 
individual states, especially developing states, are incapable of stopping pandemics by 
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themselves. Moreover, “there is a coalition of Western industrialized interests based on common 
concerns, funds, personnel and technical expertise, and this is played out in the policy arena of 
international agencies.”232 The international arena is required to ensure efficient learning is 
acquired, leading to the Western world funding many programs; this funding is necessary 
because financing programs, including medical programs, is extremely costly. The international 
arena, through multilateral and bilateral funding and information sharing, enables states to learn 
to treat diseases much as Botswana and South Africa have with HIV and tuberculosis. 
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Appendix A
These appendixes are the statistics for Botswana:
These are the graphs and raw data for the funding and infection rate.
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A:3 Global Fund to Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Funding
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A:4 Government Health Spending
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The following appendixes are the different correlation and regression relationships between 
infection rate/ incidence rate and funding.
A:5 This is a correlation regression model, showing that HIV and TB are correlated in Botswana.
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A:6 HIV Infection Rate and PEPFAR
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A:7 HIV Infection Rate and the Global Fund (HIV Program)
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(HIV)
PEPFAR USD 
(millions)
1990
1991
1992
19 3
19 4
19 5
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 24.3
18.1 51.6
18.1 54.9
18.0 76.2
17.9 93.2
17.8 95.1
-0.879856145
16.48
1.2
0
25
50
75
100
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and PEPFAR Funding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Global Fund 
(HIV money)
1990
19 1
19 2
19 3
19 4
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
0.7
1.2
.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.0 9,019,119
17.9 9,019,119
17.8 9,019,119
unable to calculate
0
2,254,779.75
4,509,559.5
6,764,339.25
9,019,119
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and Global Fund (HIV Program)
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Gov’t Public 
Expenditure 
(%)
1990
19 1
19 2
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
.2
.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 5.53
8.4 5.81
10.7 6.36
12.9 5.63
14.8 5.70
16.1 7.56
17.1 9.74
17.7 10.58
18.0 10.05
18.1 17.30
18.1 16.90
18.1 16.35
18.0 18.40
17.9 16.56
17.8 16.71
0.7434042214
0.83
0.7
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Government Expenditure
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
private (% of 
GDP)
19 0
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
200
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
.2
.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 1.99
8.4 1.97
10.7 1.92
12.9 1.73
14.8 1.63
16.1 1.79
17.1 1.56
17.7 1.66
18.0 1.87
18.1 1.83
18.1 1.85
18.1 1.66
18.0 1.65
17.9 1.65
17.8 2.05
-0.490704888
1.55
0.02
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Private Health Sepnding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Public (% of 
GDP)
199
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 2.19
8.4 2.18
10.7 2.50
12.9 2.24
14.8 2.22
16.1 2.95
17.1 3.73
17.7 4.31
18.0 4.08
18.1 6.38
18.1 5.69
18.1 4.91
18.0 6.01
17.9 5.93
17.8 8.20
0.719053848
0.45
0.25
0
2.25
4.5
6.75
9
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Health Spending
Adult Percentage (HIV)
PEPFAR 
Funding (in 
millions)
Global 
Fund 
Support
Government 
Public 
Expenditures (% 
of total budget)
Private Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
Public Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
y = 16.48+1.2x
No slope for line based on 
funding
y = 1.55+0.02x
y = 0.45+0.25x
y = 0.83+0.7xYears, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Adult Percentage Rate (HIV)
HIV Infection
HIV Infection
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A:8 HIV Infection Rate and Public Government Expenditure
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
PEPFAR USD 
(millions)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 24.3
18.1 51.6
18.1 54.9
18.0 76.2
17.9 93.2
17.8 95.1
-0.879856145
16.48
1.2
0
25
50
75
100
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and PEPFAR Funding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Global Fund 
(HIV money)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.0 9,019,119
17.9 9,019,119
17.8 9,019,119
unable to calculate
0
2,254,779.75
4,509,559.5
6,764,339.25
9,019,119
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and Global Fund (HIV Program)
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Gov’t Public 
Expenditure 
(%)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 5.53
8.4 5.81
10.7 6.36
12.9 5.63
14.8 5.70
16.1 7.56
17.1 9.74
17.7 10.58
18.0 10.05
18.1 17.30
18.1 16.90
18.1 16.35
18.0 18.40
17.9 16.56
17.8 16.71
0.7434042214
0.83
0.7
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Government Expenditure
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
private (% of 
GDP)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 1.99
8.4 1.97
10.7 1.92
12.9 1.73
14.8 1.63
16.1 1.79
17.1 1.56
17.7 1.66
18.0 1.87
18.1 1.83
18.1 1.85
18.1 1.66
18.0 1.65
17.9 1.65
17.8 2.05
-0.490704888
1.55
0.02
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Private Health Sepnding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Public (% of 
GDP)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 2.19
8.4 2.18
10.7 2.50
12.9 2.24
14.8 2.22
16.1 2.95
17.1 3.73
17.7 4.31
18.0 4.08
18.1 6.38
18.1 5.69
18.1 4.91
18.0 6.01
17.9 5.93
17.8 8.20
0.719053848
0.45
0.25
0
2.25
4.5
6.75
9
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Health Spending
Adult Percentage (HIV)
PEPFAR 
Funding (in 
millions)
Global 
Fund 
Support
Government 
Public 
Expenditures (% 
of total budget)
Private Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
Public Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
y = 16.48+1.2x
No slope for line based on 
funding
y = 1.55+0.02x
y = 0.45+0.25x
y = 0.83+0.7xYears, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Adult Percentage Rate (HIV)
HIV Infection
HIV Infection
A:9 HIV Infection and Private Health Spending
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
PEPFAR USD 
(millions)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
6
7
1998
1999
0
1
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 24.3
18.1 51.6
18.1 54.9
18.0 76.2
17.9 93.2
17.8 95.1
-0.879856145
16.48
1.2
0
25
50
75
100
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and PEPFAR Funding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Global Fund 
(HIV money)
1990
1991
1992
3
4
5
6
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.0 9,019,119
17.9 9,019,119
17.8 9,019,119
unable to calculate
0
2,254,779.75
,50 ,5 9.5
6,764,339.25
9,019,119
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and Global Fund (HIV Program)
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Gov’t Public 
Expenditure 
(%)
1990
1
2
3
4
5
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 5.53
8.4 .81
10.7 6.36
12.9 5.63
14.8 5.70
16.1 7.56
17.1 9.74
17.7 10.58
18.0 10.05
18.1 17.30
18.1 16.90
18.1 16.35
18.0 18.40
17.9 16.56
17.8 16.71
0.7434042214
0.83
0.7
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Government Expenditure
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
private (% of 
GDP)
0
1
2
3
4
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
.
.3
6.1 1.99
8.4 1.97
10.7 1.92
12.9 1.73
14.8 1.63
16.1 1.79
17.1 1.56
17.7 1.66
18.0 1.87
18.1 1.83
18.1 1.85
18.1 1.66
18.0 1.65
17.9 1.65
17.8 2.05
-0.490704888
1.55
0.02
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Private Health Sepnding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Public (% of 
GDP)
0
1
2
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 2.19
8.4 2.18
10.7 2.50
12.9 2.24
14.8 2.22
16.1 2.95
17.1 3.73
17.7 4.31
18.0 4.08
18.1 6.38
18.1 5.69
18.1 4.91
18.0 6.01
17.9 5.93
17.8 8.20
0.719053848
0.45
0.25
0
2.25
4.5
6.75
9
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Health Spending
Adult Percentage (HIV)
PEPFAR 
Funding (in 
millions)
Global 
Fund 
Support
Government 
Public 
Expenditures (% 
of total budget)
Private Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
Public Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
y = 16.48+1.2x
No slope for line based on 
funding
y = 1.55+0.02x
y = 0.45+0.25x
y = 0.83+0.7xYears, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Adult Percentage Rate (HIV)
HIV Infection
HIV Infection
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A:10 HIV Infection and Public Health Spending
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
PEPFAR USD 
(millions)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 24.3
18.1 51.6
18.1 54.9
18.0 76.2
17.9 93.2
17.8 95.1
-0.879856145
16.48
1.2
0
25
50
75
100
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and PEPFAR Funding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Global Fund 
(HIV money)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1
8.4
10.7
12.9
14.8
16.1
17.1
17.7
18.0
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.1 9,019,119
18.0 9,019,119
17.9 9,019,119
17.8 9,019,119
unable to calculate
0
2,254,779.75
4,509,559.5
6,764,339.25
9,019,119
17.7 17.8 17.9 18 18.1
HIV Infection and Global Fund (HIV Program)
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Gov’t Public 
Expenditure 
(%)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 5.53
8.4 5.81
10.7 6.36
12.9 5.63
14.8 5.70
16.1 7.56
17.1 9.74
17.7 10.58
18.0 10.05
18.1 17.30
18.1 16.90
18.1 16.35
18.0 18.40
17.9 16.56
17.8 16.71
0.7434042214
0.83
0.7
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Government Expenditure
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
private (% of 
GDP)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 1.99
8.4 1.97
10.7 1.92
12.9 1.73
14.8 1.63
16.1 1.79
17.1 1.56
17.7 1.66
18.0 1.87
18.1 1.83
18.1 1.85
18.1 1.66
18.0 1.65
17.9 1.65
17.8 2.05
-0.490704888
1.55
0.02
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Private Health Sepnding
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Public (% of 
GDP)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 2.19
8.4 2.18
10.7 2.50
12.9 2.24
14.8 2.22
16.1 2.95
17.1 3.73
17.7 4.31
18.0 4.08
18.1 6.38
18.1 5.69
18.1 4.91
18.0 6.01
17.9 5.93
17.8 8.20
0.719053848
0.45
0.25
0
2.25
4.5
6.75
9
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Public Health Spending
Adult Percentage (HIV)
PEPFAR 
Funding (in 
millions)
Global 
Fund 
Support
Government 
Public 
Expenditures (% 
of total budget)
Private Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
Public Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
y = 16.48+1.2x
No slope for line based on 
funding
y = 1.55+0.02x
y = 0.45+0.25x
y = 0.83+0.7xYears, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Adult Percentage Rate (HIV)
HIV Infection
HIV Infection
A:11 Tuberculosis Incidence Rate and the Global Fund (Tuberculosis Program)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Predicted
1990
19 1
19 2
19 3
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
20 2
20 3
20 4
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
3.5 533
5.1 612
7.3 683
10.1 748
13.3 804
16.6 855
19.7 900
22.2 931
24.1 941
25.3 938
26.0 918
26.3 882
26.3 845
26.1 810
25.8 773
25.5 733
25.3 690
25.1 645
24.9 596
24.8 545
0.4031752085
584.55
9.32
0
250
500
750
1000
0 7.5 15 22.5 30
HIV Infection and Tuberculosis Infection
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Global Fund 
(TB in USD)
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855
1996 900
1997 931
1998 941
1999 938
2000 918
2001 882
2002 845
2003 810
2004 773
2005 733
2006 690 2,797,173
2007 645 3,289,373
2008 596 3,949,978
2009 545 3,975,343
R Value -0.947865857
Intercept 8831261.67
Slope -8607.91
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
0 175 350 525 700
Tuberculosis Incidence vs Global Fund (Tuberculosis)
Incidence per 100,000 people
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Gov’t Public 
Expenditure
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855 5.53
1996 900 5.81
1997 931 6.36
1998 941 5.63
1999 938 5.70
2000 918 7.56
2001 882 9.74
2002 845 10.58
2003 810 10.05
2004 773 17.30
2005 733 16.90
2006 690 16.35
2007 645 18.40
2008 596 16.56
2009 545 16.71
R Vaule -0.885818021
Intercept --0.03
Slope 39.12
0
5
10
15
20
0 250 500 750 1000
Tuberculosis Incidence and Goverment Public Health Expenditure
Incidence per 100,000 people
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
private (% of 
GDP)
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855 1.99
1996 900 1.97
1997 931 1.92
1998 941 1.73
1999 938 1.63
2000 918 1.79
2001 882 1.56
2002 845 1.66
2003 810 1.87
2004 773 1.83
2005 733 1.85
2006 690 1.66
2007 645 1.65
2008 596 1.65
2009 545 2.05
R Vaulue -0.05476261
Intercept 1.84
Slope 0
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 250 500 750 1000
Tuberculosis Incidence and Private Health Spending
Incidence per 100,000 people
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Public (% of 
GDP)
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855 2.19
1996 900 2.18
1997 931 2.50
1998 941 2.24
1999 938 2.22
2000 918 2.95
2001 882 3.73
2002 845 4.31
2003 810 4.08
2004 773 6.38
2005 733 5.69
2006 690 4.91
2007 645 6.01
2008 596 5.93
2009 545 8.20
R Value -0.908921093
Intercept 14.77
Slope -0.01
0
2.25
4.5
6.75
9
0 250 500 750 1000
Tuberculosis Incidence and Public Health Spending
Incidence per 100,000 people
Tuberculosis 
infection (per 
100,000 people)
Global Fund 
Financing 
(USD)
Government Public 
Expenditure (% of 
Total Budget)
Private Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
Public Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
y = 584.55 + 9.32X
y = 8831261.67 -8607.91x
y = 39.12 -0.03x
y = 1.84 -0.00006X
y = 14.77 -0.01x
Incidence per 100,000 people
Tuberculosis Incident per 100,000 people
HIV Infection
Incidence per 100,000 people
Incidence per 100,000 people
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A:12 Tuberculosis Incidence and Government Public Health Expenditure
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Predicted
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
3.5 533
5.1 612
7.3 683
10.1 748
13.3 804
16.6 855
19.7 900
22.2 931
24.1 941
25.3 938
26.0 918
26.3 882
26.3 845
26.1 810
25.8 773
25.5 733
25.3 690
25.1 645
24.9 596
24.8 545
0.4031752085
584.55
9.32
0
250
500
750
1000
0 7.5 15 22.5 30
HIV Infection and Tuberculosis Infection
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Global Fund 
(TB in USD)
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855
1996 900
1997 931
1998 941
1999 938
2000 918
2001 882
2002 845
2003 810
2004 773
2005 733
2006 690 2,797,173
2007 645 3,289,373
2008 596 3,949,978
2009 545 3,975,343
R Value -0.947865857
Intercept 8831261.67
Slope -8607.91
0
1,000,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
4,000,000
0 175 350 525 700
Tuberculosis Incidence vs Global Fund (Tuberculosis)
Incidence per 100,000 people
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Gov’t Public 
Expenditure
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855 5.53
1996 900 5.81
1997 931 6.36
1998 941 5.63
1999 938 5.70
2000 918 7.56
2001 882 9.74
2002 845 10.58
2003 810 10.05
2004 773 17.30
2005 733 16.90
2006 690 16.35
2007 645 18.40
2008 596 16.56
2009 545 16.71
R Vaule -0.885818021
Intercept --0.03
Slope 39.12
0
5
10
15
20
0 250 500 750 1000
Tuberculosis Incidence and Goverment Public Health Expenditure
Incidence per 100,000 people
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
private (% of 
GDP)
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855 1.99
1996 900 1.97
1997 931 1.92
1998 941 1.73
1999 938 1.63
2000 918 1.79
2001 882 1.56
2002 845 1.66
2003 810 1.87
2004 773 1.83
2005 733 1.85
2006 690 1.66
2007 645 1.65
2008 596 1.65
2009 545 2.05
R Vaulue -0.05476261
Intercept 1.84
Slope 0
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 250 500 750 1000
Tuberculosis Incidence and Private Health Spending
Incidence per 100,000 people
Year Incidence per 
100,000 
people
Public (% of 
GDP)
1990 533
1991 612
1992 683
1993 748
1994 804
1995 855 2.19
1996 900 2.18
1997 931 2.50
1998 941 2.24
1999 938 2.22
2000 918 2.95
2001 882 3.73
2002 845 4.31
2003 810 4.08
2004 773 6.38
2005 733 5.69
2006 690 4.91
2007 645 6.01
2008 596 5.93
2009 545 8.20
R Value -0.908921093
Intercept 14.77
Slope -0.01
0
2.25
4.5
6.75
9
0 250 500 750 1000
Tuberculosis Incidence and Public Health Spending
Incidence per 100,000 people
Tuberculosis 
infection (per 
100,000 people)
Global Fund 
Financing 
(USD)
Government Public 
Expenditure (% of 
Total Budget)
Private Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
Public Health 
Spending (% 
of GDP)
y = 584.55 + 9.32X
y = 8831261.67 -8607.91x
y = 39.12 -0.03x
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A:13 Tuberculosis Incidence and Private Health Spending
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A:14 Tuberculosis Incidence and Public Health Spending
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Appendix B
These appendixes are the statistics for South Africa:
The data tables below are funding statistics:
B:1 World Bank Funding
Year Funding (USD)
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
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2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
270,450,000
293,070,000
386,170,000
362,300,000
495,590,000
512,980,000
540,440,000
486,370,000
425,310,000
511,240,000
655,530,000
628,920,000
689,960,000
714,820,000
807,330,000
1,124,940,000
1,075,020,000
Year USD in 
millions
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
total:
89.3
143.3
221.6
397.8
590.9
561.3
560.4
548.7
3113.4
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2008
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2011
2012
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13,720,585
21,250,901
51,204,127
71,073,173
97,172,340
140,817,454
161,282,400
184,559,390
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B:2 HIV PEPFAR Program
Year Funding (USD)
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B:3 HIV Global Fund Program
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B:4 Government Health Spending 
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The following appendixes are the correlation and regression statistics that were run with 
infection rate and funding
B:5 HIV Infection Rate and Tuberculosis Incidence Rate (this particular relationships shows that 
in South Africa HIV and tuberculosis are correlated).
Year Infection Rate (TB/
100,000 people)
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1993
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B:6 HIV Infection and PEPFAR
Year Percent 
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Funding 
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HIV Infection Rate vs. Public Government Spending
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HIV Infection Rate vs. Public Government Spending
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B:7 HIV Infection and the Global Fund
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HIV Infection Rate vs. Public Government Spending
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HIV Infection vs. Private Spending
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HIV Infection Rate vs. Public Government Spending
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B:9 HIV Infection Rate and Private Health Spending
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
PEPFAR USD 
(millions)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
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HIV Infection and PEPFAR Funding
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HIV Infection and Public Government Expenditure
Adult Percentage (HIV)
Year Adult 
Percentage 
(HIV)
private (% of 
GDP)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
R Value
Intercept
Slope
0.7
1.2
1.8
2.9
4.3
6.1 1.99
8.4 1.97
10.7 1.92
12.9 1.73
14.8 1.63
16.1 1.79
17.1 1.56
17.7 1.66
18.0 1.87
18.1 1.83
18.1 1.85
18.1 1.66
18.0 1.65
17.9 1.65
17.8 2.05
-0.490704888
1.55
0.02
0
0.525
1.05
1.575
2.1
0 5 10 15 20
HIV Infection and Private Health Sepnding
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HIV Infection and Public Health Spending
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Adult Percentage Rate (HIV)
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B:10 HIV Infection Rate and Public Health Spending
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HIV Infection Rate vs. Public Government Spending
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B:11 Tuberculosis Incidence and Government Public Spending
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Appendix C
Generalizing the Policy Translation Experience
 Is there a way to understand how policies are translated from the international realm to 
state programs? Policy translation is a multi-step process that includes the bureaucracy, 
legislature, and executive branch in order to embrace a policy. Following in line with the idea of 
incrementalism and Kingdon’s stages, as described in chapter 2, policy translation is a step 
process. The steps include incrementalism and the evolution of time. The following steps can be 
used to describe the process of translation:
 1. International representatives present the norms/ recommendations from the 
 international regime;
 2. The appropriate bureaucracy and interconnected agencies review the norms/ 
 recommendations;
 3. Considering and integrating the international recommendations into state policy;
 4. A policy is proposed to the legislative body (hopefully will support of the head of 
 state);
 5. Approval and implementation of the policy.
These steps allow for the variety in types of policy making systems and for different types of 
policy norms besides health to be considered. Further, the provided step process follows inline 
with the policy narratives of Botswana and South Africa. 
 This more generalized view on policy translation is applicable for other instances of 
international norms being accepted in state policies. Due to the fact that international policies are 
altering due to the learning process, there are opportunities for international policy 
recommendations to be translated in many arenas. While this particular step process has only 
been used in the above investigation, there is opportunity to use this process for other regime 
norms. 
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